State spatial practices and uneven development: Flexible rescaling in Appalachia by Core, Jacquelyn Jordon
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2010 
State spatial practices and uneven development: Flexible 
rescaling in Appalachia 
Jacquelyn Jordon Core 
West Virginia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Core, Jacquelyn Jordon, "State spatial practices and uneven development: Flexible rescaling in 
Appalachia" (2010). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 4576. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4576 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
 
 
 
State Spatial Practices and Uneven Development: 
Flexible Rescaling in Appalachia 
 
 
 
Jacquelyn Jordon Core 
 
 
 
Dissertation submitted to the 
Eberly College of Arts and Sciences 
at West Virginia University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Geography 
 
 
 
Graduate Committee 
 
Dr. Robert Hanham, Ph.D (Chair) 
Dr. Richard Hoch, Ph.D 
Dr. Jamie Jacobs, Ph.D 
Dr. Ken Martis, Ph.D 
Dr. Brent McCusker, Ph.D 
 
 
 
Department of Geology and Geography 
 
Morgantown, West Virginia 
2010 
 
 
 
Keywords: State Spatial Practices, Uneven Development, Flexible Rescaling, Dispossession, 
Eminent Domain, Appalachia 
ABSTRACT 
 
State Spatial Practices and Uneven Development: 
Flexible Rescaling in Appalachia 
 
Jacquelyn Core 
 
 
Geographic theories regarding uneven development, including Neil Smith’s convergence 
of Marxist theory and spatial development and David Harvey’s development of scalar fix and 
later conceptual development of the process of capital accumulation, historically have focused 
primarily on how and why uneven development occurs.  Research to date has provided only a 
cursory examination of what role, if any, the state plays in impacting uneven development, has 
not endeavored to characterize the state as an active, purposeful spatial player in the process of 
uneven development, and has not conceptualized how the state impacts uneven development 
through spatial practices, if the state does in fact do so.  This dissertation attempts to fill that gap 
in the literature by examining the state’s role in uneven development and theorizing that the state 
plays an active spatial role in impacting uneven development to benefit capital interests.  The 
dissertation conceptually develops and illustrates a new theory of flexible rescaling which builds 
on the prior work of Smith and Harvey and attempts to elucidate the under conceptualized role of 
the state.  Through flexible rescaling the state can be seen actively engaged in the redistribution 
of internal power within the confines of an already established but inherently flexible fixed 
network of power, acting as a committee serving the interests of capital.  This dissertation uses 
dialectics as its methodology, both to develop the conceptual framework and to illustrate the 
state’s use of it in a more concrete context where the state rescales power upward or downward 
or rescales power laterally to facilitate spatial change while fostering consent and/or overcoming 
any obstacle to spatial change.  The dissertation uses examples from Appalachia of land practices 
resulting in uneven development brought about by state spatial practices that benefit capital to 
illustrate the theoretical development of flexible rescaling. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
"The dialectic is critical, because it helps us to become critical of what our role has been up to 
now."   Bertell Ollman, Dialectical Investigations, 1993, p. 19. 
 
To date the state's spatial role in uneven development has remained somewhat 
under-theorized.  Geographic research to date has failed to conceptually examine the state's 
spatial role in uneven development in terms of the relationship between capital accumulation 
strategies and state spatial practices.  Theories of scaling and rescaling are well developed.  
Researchers have recognized that the state can scale and rescale, but they have failed to view that 
rescaling as an active spatial practice which the state employs to affirmatively impact uneven 
development to benefit capital.   
This ability of the state to scale and rescale comes with an inherent flexibility 
which has been built into the state system.  Laws and regulations governing the operations of 
states have mechanisms in place to allow rescaling through what has already been recognized as 
a downward shift or devolution of power. (Smith, 2003). The corresponding ability of states to 
shift power upward has not been as thoroughly explored.  When we recognize the ability to shift 
power and responsibility upward and downward through the scales of the state or laterally within 
the state system in place and without formal restructuring, within the context of accumulation 
strategies, the new concept of flexible rescaling emerges.   
To fully examine and understand this concept of flexible rescaling we need to first 
recognize the dependency between Harvey's two forms of capital accumulation strategies.  That 
is, we must recognize, as Harvey does, that without accumulation by dispossession there could 
be no accumulation by expanded reproduction.  It is this need to shift between forms of capital 
accumulation that creates a need within the state to flexibly rescale.  Power must be shifted to 
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allow the regulation and oversight necessary to coordinate the transition between forms of capital 
accumulation.  The first capital accumulation strategy is accumulation by expanded reproduction 
and the second is accumulation by dispossession. (Harvey, 2003). By examining the connections 
between Harvey's two forms of capital accumulation, we can recognize state rescaling itself as a 
spatial practice.  As the state purposefully shifts power to flexibly rescale, capital shifts between 
forms of accumulation, thereby resulting in uneven development.  The two processes are closely 
intertwined: without the ability to flexibly rescale and the inherent power shifts within the state 
which accompany flexible rescaling capital would be unable to transition between accumulation 
by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction, which transition ultimately results 
in continued capital growth and expansion.   
Smith and Harvey have both discussed at length the need by capital to continually 
expand as well as the ways capital attempts to achieve that goal of continued expansion.  (e.g. 
Smith, 1992; Harvey, 2005).  They have not examined the state's role in facilitating that 
expansion through rescaling.  Harvey has recognized two distinct forms of capital accumulation, 
but he has not fully developed how the transitions and connections between them are driven by 
the state’s role in actively rescaling power.  This dissertation will develop the new concept of 
flexible rescaling as a state spatial practice and will provide concrete examples of the state’s 
flexible rescaling with regard to land acquisitions in Appalachia.  The dissertation will examine 
how the state uses spatial practices to impact uneven development to benefit capital; that is, it 
will examine how the state flexibly rescales. 
In this more concrete context, in Appalachia, this flexible rescaling can be seen in 
its simplest form when examining state sponsored or sanctioned land acquisitions.  The concept 
can be illustrated by examining land acquisitions in Appalachia in two time periods.  First, 
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flexible rescaling can be seen during the early transition from self sufficient farming to 
dependency on capital employment through industrialization when the state changed scales to 
allow accumulation by dispossession to occur as a necessary precursor to accumulation by 
expanded reproduction.  Second, flexible rescaling can also be seen in Appalachia though 
modern eminent domain practices sanctioned by the state which have begun to take private 
property for "public use" and later for “public benefit” - primarily used here to demonstrate the 
concept of flexible rescaling itself at work. 
The dissertation summarizes Marxist theories of the state on which the 
dissertation is based and summarizes the concept of uneven development as it has been 
developed to date and as it is assumed herein.  Geographic research to date regarding the two 
forms of capital accumulation strategies and regarding scaling and rescaling is reviewed.  
Geographical theorizations to date on the state's role in uneven development are also reviewed, 
summarizing the traditional views of the state and its spatial practices and reviewing work that 
already establishes some link between state spatial practices and capital accumulation, including 
research by Brenner, Smith, and Harvey.  The dialectical method is explained to facilitate an 
understanding of the how the concept of flexible rescaling was developed here.  A contribution 
to the geographic literature on the state's active spatial role in uneven development is made in 
developing of the new concept of flexible rescaling.  Flexible rescaling will be illustrated 
through two case studies involving land acquisitions in Appalachia: the early transition from 
subsistence agriculture to industrialism and the later, more modern, example of how flexible 
rescaling continues to be used by the state through eminent domain.   
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Chapter 2 
Marxist Theories of the State 
 
This dissertation uses a Marxist view of the state.  Therefore, an examination of 
Marxist theorizations of the state is helpful to an understanding of this research.  Such 
theorizations are hallmarked by their treatment of the state as "the committee for managing the 
affairs of capitalists."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 89).  As a result, Marxists never see the state as neutral.  
The later examined example of eminent domain as illustrative of the conceptual development of 
flexible rescaling is clearest when we recognize, as a precursor to the conceptual development, 
that the state acts primarily on behalf of and manages first and foremost the interests of capital. 
Marxist state theorists always see the state as acting this way: on behalf of capital's interests.  
"In Marx's theory of politics, the capitalist state is conceived of as a complex 
social relation of many different aspects, the main ones being political processes and institutions, 
the ruling class, an objective structure of political/economic functions, and an arena for class 
struggle."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 89).  Different theorists focus on different aspects in theorizing the 
state.  Ollman refers to these as "one-sided relations."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 89).  Generally, Lenin 
and Ralph Milliband are associated with instrumental Marxism and Nicos Poulantzas is 
associated with structural Marxism, although Poulantzas later refined his own theory of the state 
to define the state as an arena for class struggle.  Antonio Gramsci is regarded as characterizing 
the state as hegemonic.  Bertell Ollman is regarded as characterizing the state primarily as an 
illusory community that forms from social relations.  
Each one-sided interpretation of the state referred to here "brings out something 
important about the capitalist state- about its appearance, structure, functioning (including 
contradictory functioning), ties to the rest of capitalism, and potential for change- just as it hides 
and distorts much else."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 90).  Each one-sided relation "represent[s] . . . 
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different tendencies inside the state relation," thus magnifying Marx's focus on internal relations.  
(Ollman, 1993, p. 91).  Brief discussions of each of the primary state theorists whose theories are 
relied upon to any extent in this dissertation, including their differences, are contained below.  
However, it is important to note before proceeding that none of the Marxist theorists who will be 
discussed here is responsible for an incorrect Marxist theorization of the state.  Rather, their 
theorizations evidence the dialectical method and are illustrative of the different abstractions of 
extension, level of generality, and vantage point discussed in more detail below, when discussing 
the dialectical method.  Regardless of the specific theorist relied upon, capital's interests remain 
at the forefront of rationale for state activity.  Herein, primary reliance is made on the Marxist 
state theory of Ralph Milliband to explain state action in the context of capital benefit. 
2.1 Milliband's State 
Ralph Milliband's seminal work on the Marxist state is "The State in Capitalist 
Society."  (Milliband, 1969).  Milliband is regarded as an instrumentalist, or Leninist Marxist, 
because he refers to the state as an "instrument" or "tool" available for use by capital to ensure 
the maintenance of conditions of uneven development beneficial to capital.  This view of the 
state is primarily best suited to the development of the concept of flexible rescaling, because it 
demonstrates and recognizes both the state's volitional actions as well as capital's reliance on the 
state for those actions as a means to secure conditions of uneven development favorable to 
capital.   
For Milliband, the state is operated by the ruling capitalist class, the bourgeoisie, 
who either directly control the means of production or who are aligned socially with those who 
control the means of production.  (Milliband, 1969).  As a result, it makes sense that the state 
acts on capital's behalf.  Milliband also recognizes the simple economic power of the bourgeoisie 
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and its influence on state action.  Those in power within society are in a better position to impact 
state action.  They are more educated, they have more resources to devote to impacting or 
influencing state action, and they are operating within society on the same level as the ruling 
elite within the state.  These ruling class members who control the functions of the state, 
therefore, typically act in the best interest of those who control the means of production, their 
peers.   
The formal lobby system in the United States, whereby capital interests are 
allowed to pay individuals and firms with specialized knowledge about their particular industry 
to attempt to influence those within the state exemplifies the connection between the state and 
the bourgeoisie.  The state elite and the capital elite operate in parallel frameworks within the 
state and capitalist society.  Their interests in that regard are aligned in a way that gives natural 
inclination to the state elite to adopt the interests of the capital elite.  However, Milliband also 
addressed state power as requiring the legitimacy of the workers within society.  (Milliband, 
1969).   
In terms of the requirement of legitimacy, Milliband argued that the state uses its 
influence on behalf of the bourgeoisie through education, propaganda, and regulation to coopt 
the working class into the system of capitalism, despite the system's actual failure to serve the 
best interests of those workers.  (Milliband, 1969).  Milliband seems to suggest that given the 
relative potential power of workers, including their shear numerosity, the political system 
expected to result would be one that advantages the interests of the worker over the bourgeoisie.  
Milliband recognized, however, that despite this relative potential power the resulting system 
will almost always mirror the system sought by the bourgeoisie.  Milliband explains this seeming 
anomaly by noting that alliances of the bourgeoisie with those in power, and the economic power 
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of those members of the bourgeoisie whose interests are typically advanced, result in a political 
system which ultimately is counterintuitive.  He sees the system as theoretically capable of 
advantaging the worker but unlikely to do so in the end.  That is, regardless of the democratic 
nature of a given state and regardless of the numerosity of workers, because of the power of the 
bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie's interests will control. The door remains open to research into the 
bourgeoisie’s control of media and propaganda in securing this legitimation and how that control 
is fostered by the state as a secondary aspect of flexible rescaling. 
2.2 Poulantzas' State 
While Milliband and Poulantzas agree for the most part about the Marxist state, 
Poulantzas is commonly regarded as a structural Marxist.  Ollman notes that the "state is said to 
be an instrument of the ruling economic class; but Marx also treats [the state] as a set of 
objective structures that respond to the requirements of the economy."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 
67)(emphasis added).  Therefore, it can be said, under Ollman's recognition, that Milliband and 
Poulantzas both arguably correctly articulate Marx's conception of the state.  The two simply 
focus on different aspects or internal relations within Marx's conceptualization of the state.  
Ollman posits that "many similar, apparently contradictory positions taken in Marx's writings . . . 
are due to different abstractions of vantage point.  The same relation is being viewed from 
different sides, or the same process from its different moments."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 67-8).   
To the extent that any distinction does exist, Poulantzas distinction from 
Milliband arises from his position that, instead of the state being an instrument of control and 
domination over workers used by the bourgeoisie, Poulantzas believes that the state is actually 
socially formed by the bourgeoisie.  (Poulantzas, 2001).  His Marxist state theory is premised on 
integration of the state with bourgeoisie society.  He sees the bourgeoisie as integral to the state 
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and as a part of the state rather than as controlling or using the state. For Poulantzas, at least in 
his early writings, a non-capitalist state could not exist within a capitalist economic system.  His 
theory deprives workers of the ability to control the system with its current incarnation by 
meshing the bourgeoisie with the state in such a way as to make it impossible for workers to 
even garner any influence over the state.  To impact the system workers would have to 
restructure the system itself to be a non-capitalist state.  As a result, Milliband's state theory 
better encompasses the conceptual development of flexible rescaling.  Milliband's theory could 
allow power at times to be seated with the worker, instead of at all times being seated within the 
state.  
Anyone who rises to power in the state as Poulantzas sees it will assume the cloak 
of the bourgeoisie.  The state theory Poulantzas adopts relies on the appearance of "relative 
autonomy," whereby workers are not perceived to be directly controlled by those who retain the 
means or production, but, rather, the perception of workers is that the state is autonomous- 
separate and apart from the bourgeoisie, when in fact it is not.  (Poulantzas, 2001).  Whereas, 
Milliband's conceptualization of the state as an instrument of capital would allow workers to 
assume power within the state and, at least theoretically, change the nature of the state within a 
capitalist society, Poulantzas would require revolution to achieve this goal as the working class 
would have to both assume power and achieve the political and economic backing within society 
that might allow a working class agenda to be followed.   
The differences articulated between Milliband and Poulantzas touched off a 
heated debate, largely based on the relative autonomy each granted or denied to the state.  
Ollman, however, notes that: 
The widespread debate among Marxists over the relative autonomy 
of the state usually goes on at cross purposes because the people 
 
 9 
involved do not sufficiently distinguish between these different 
Marxist interpretations of the state, and hence whether (under 
certain circumstances) the state is relatively autonomous from the 
ruling or capitalist class, or from economic requirements of 
capitalism, or from other alienated social relations, etc.  As a 
matter of fact, there is a case to be made for relative autonomy 
within each of these perspectives on the state.  What is important is 
to avoid the confusion that results from thinking there is only one 
debate when there are really several. 
 
(Ollman, 1993, p. 92).  Milliband viewed the state from the vantage point of the ruling economic 
class.  Poulantzas viewed that same state from the vantage point of the socio-economic structure 
that encases political function.  "As a result, Milliband is better able to account for the traditional 
role of the state in serving ruling class interests." (Ollman, 1993, p. 78).  "Poulantzas has an 
easier time explaining the relative autonomy of the state, and why the capitalist state continues to 
serve the ruling class when the latter is not directly in control of state institutions.”  (Ollman, 
1993, p. 78).   
Later, Poulantzas altered his theorization of the state (by altering his abstractions) 
to reflect the state as an arena for class action. (Poulantzas, 2001).   Poulantzas relied heavily on 
Gramsci in formulating his later Marxist state, but Gramsci differed in ways that seem to seat 
him closer to Milliband with regard to state theorizations.  
2.3 Gramsci's Contribution 
Unlike Poulantzas or Milliband, Gramsci never developed a comprehensive 
theory of the state, but he made significant contributions to Marxist theorizations of the state 
which are relevant to this dissertation, and he helped explain the absence of Marxist revolution.  
Primarily, Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony, or rule by some level of consent, 
thereby theoretically allowing the influences of the societal masses to impact the state if consent 
was withdrawn.  (Forgacs (ed.), 2000).  This development is particularly relevant in this 
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dissertation, because it explains the need for a devolution or shift in power.  Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony underlies the conceptual development of flexible rescaling, because it explains why 
the state would need to shift power within the structure of the system.  If viewed in terms of 
hegemony, flexible rescaling occurs as result of a threat of withdrawn consent.  The state 
attempts to maintain or regain consent by shifting power to another scale- a scale at which 
potential opposition would be differently structured in a way that benefitted capital or a scale at 
which the composition or strength of opposition might differ in a way that made the opposition 
more manageable by the state and/or capital or in a way that allowed opposition to be overcome.   
Gramsci's concept of hegemony attempted to explain why Marxist revolution had 
not occurred by the 20th century.  Consent had prevented a revolution.  (Forgacs, ed., 2000).  In 
the context of eminent domain, Gramsci's concept of hegemony will be used to explain why the 
Kelo decision focused so heavily on "public benefit" and why the doctrines of “public use” and 
“public benefit” have become cornerstones of American Eminent Domain.  Briefly, for example, 
and as will be explained in more detail later, the United States Supreme Court handed down a 
decision commonly referred to as “Kelo” wherein capital attempted to gain consent to 
accumulation by dispossession by selling public benefit to those being dispossessed.1  Kelo v. 
City of New London.  This form of consent gathering explains why successful eminent domain 
projects have surrounded public works projects or projects couched in public works, as will be 
explained in more detail later in discussing the new concept of flexible rescaling. (see generally, 
(Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and Poletown Neighborhood Council 
                                                 
1 Kelo v. New London is an eminent domain case that was heard by the United States Supreme Court.  The town of 
New London wanted to hand over its legal ability to seize private homes to a private entity, the New London 
Development Corp, in order to "develop" the area for Pfizer, which had a plant in the area.  One homeowner, Susette 
Kelo, appealed her claim to the United States Supreme Court which ultimately ruled against her.  Now Pfizer is 
pulling out of the deal following its merger with Wyeth. 
 
 11 
v. City of Detroit). 
Gramsci recognized that to achieve consent the Marxist state does not always act 
entirely in the self-interest of the bourgeoisie.  Rather Gramsci's state was capable of acting in 
the short term interest of the working class to the detriment of the short term interest of the 
bourgeoisie so long as ultimate benefit to the bourgeoisie could be maintained, thereby 
preventing revolution.  In the high voltage transmission line case in Appalachia, the West 
Virginia Public Service Commission forced TrAIL to study an alternate route for the line which 
parallels an existing high voltage transmission line.  TrAIL objected stating that the alternate 
route was outside the study area dictated by TrAIL and that it was an inferior route, but the State 
forced the study on the route regardless, thereby acting in the short term interest of citizens.   
(WV PSC Case No. 07-0508-E-CN).  The alternate route was the one approved by the West 
Virginia Public Service Commission, thereby obtaining some level of public consent, at least by 
those who actively opposed the original route, who at that point essentially disappeared from the 
TrAIL opposition.  This battle over electrical lines will be more thoroughly explored later, but it 
is introduced here to illustrate how Gramsci's theory of hegemony was exemplified when the 
ultimate route was approved.  If the original route had been approved, then TrAil and its capital 
interest would have succeeded but consent would not have been obtained.  But when the 
alternate route was ultimately approved, then the bourgeoisie interest in seeing the line built was 
still realized, despite the state acting in the short term interest of citizenry whose land would 
have been taken by the original but not the alternate route. Gramsci justified such actions based 
on a recognition that state action takes place against a complex backdrop of political, economic, 
and social relations. (Forgacs (ed.), 2000). 
Gramsci examined generally how the state was able to subordinate the will of the 
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masses to the interests of the elite. (Forgacs (ed.), 2000).  He noted differences between 
domination by exercise of force and domination by ideology or consent. (Forgacs (ed.), 2000).  
These ideas form the bases of Gramsci's concept of hegemony.  For Gramsci the concept of 
hegemony involved at least some level of consent to being ruled, in addition to some application 
of force and violence.  The ruling class establishes hegemony at the point when it has gained the 
consent of the class being ruled to the violence being exerted by the state.  This concept of 
hegemony is revisited below in discussing the TrAIL project in more detail and in the context of 
the examination and development of the concept of flexible rescaling.2 
                                                 
2 At the time of publication of this dissertation, TrAIL was in the permitting stages in West Virginia, having been 
approved in principle by the WV PSC in January of 2009. 
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Chapter 3 
Uneven Development and the State 
 
In its simplest form, "uneven development" is the purposeful social and spatial 
differentiation of development between persons and places.  (Smith, 1990, Ch. 4).  Such 
purposeful differentiation means that both economic and social development is uneven over 
space and time.  Smith links uneven development to the geographical expansion of the 
contradictions of capital.   He sees both development and underdevelopment as connected 
processes necessary to capitalism.  Underdevelopment is not just the failure of an area to 
develop; it is actively produced. (Frank, 1967).   In other words, capital is agglomerated in one 
place in favour of another. (Smith, 1990).  The need for continued expansion in capitalism results 
in either necessary geographic expansion, with attendant development and underdevelopment, or 
expansion by some other means, such as where places are redeveloped and resources are 
recaptured as a means on expansion.  Either way the process of capitalism reinvents itself, and 
patterns of unevenness change over time as social and spatial development ebbs and flows. 
Initially, some places are naturally better suited for development to occur, and, as 
a result, initial development occurs faster and with greater complexity in those areas.  (Smith, 
1990).  The logical corollary is that areas that are not as well suited for development initially lag 
behind, and uneven development results.  But these natural conditions that spark or suppress 
development fail to explain the purposeful and extreme level of differentiation eventually 
observable. 
With the advent of transportation and advances in communication, the natural 
obstacles of some places, namely raw materials and distance or relative isolation, largely are 
overcome.  So while the principle of natural advantage adequately explains initial uneven 
development, it fails to explain the continuation of uneven development or why, with 
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technological advancements, underdeveloped places never manage to catch up. 
The continuation of uneven development following the equalization of the playing 
field by transportation and communication results from the division created by capital of the 
means of production between classes. When the means of production are taken from workers, 
and reside only with capitalists, uneven development results.  (Smith, 1990, Ch. 4).  In essence, 
the capitalist process then actively creates pockets of development and underdevelopment 
necessary for capital accumulation to continue.  The capitalist process creates a system where 
power and resources are purposefully concentrated in the hands of some while others are kept 
without access to or control over that power and those resources.  This system forces those 
without the benefit of development to be and remain dependent on the opposing pockets of 
development.  
Harvey recently added to Smith's theory of uneven geographical development by 
arguing for a dialectical and relational approach built upon four radically distinct recognized 
conditionalities.  "The four conditionalities are: 
1) The material embedding of capital accumulation processes in the web of socio-
ecological life. 
2) Accumulation by dispossession (a generalization of Marx's concept of 'primitive' or 
'original' accumulation under which preexisting assets are assembled as labor powers, money, 
productive capacity or as commodities and put into circulation as capital). 
3) The law-like character of capital accumulation in space and time. 
4) Political, social, and 'class' struggles at a variety of geographical scales." 
(Harvey, 2006, p. 75). 
 
 15 
Harvey urges stressing the internal relations between these conditionalities.  He 
advocates for a theory that "acknowledges the power and importance of certain processes that are 
specifiable independently of each other but which can and must be brought together into a 
dynamic field of interaction."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 76).  Essentially, here he advocates for a more 
dialectical and less formulaic approach to analyzing and explaining uneven development.  
Harvey retains the spatial focus of uneven development.  "The very term uneven 
geographical development is predicated upon some conception of what spatiality is all about."  
(Harvey, 2006, p. 77).  He urges us, however, to continue to view spatiality as Lefebvre and 
Smith explained it, as "actively produced and as an active moment within the spatial process."  
(Harvey, 2006, p. 77).   
The traditional examinations of the state's role in uneven development have been 
limited.  These traditional examinations are dominated by three geographers (Brenner, Smith, 
and Harvey) whose work is discussed below.  This dissertation seeks to illustrate that the valid 
connections made to date between the state and uneven development by those three geographers 
remain under-theorized, however, largely because none of the three have undertaken any 
significant analysis of the interconnections between active state spatial practices and capital 
accumulation processes. 
Before further exploring the link between active state spatial practices and capital 
accumulation strategies and the resultant production of uneven development theorized by this 
dissertation, it is necessary to examine the work done on state spatial practices and capital 
accumulation strategies independent of one another and the existing work that links the state and 
uneven development. 
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3.1 Capital Accumulation Strategies 
Harvey has re-identified and named two distinct, but dialectically related, forms 
of capital accumulation, accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded 
reproduction.  Both forms have their genesis, according to Harvey, in collective imperialist 
practices between capitalists and the state, which practices are typically about exploiting the 
uneven geographical conditions under which capital accumulation occurs which take advantage 
of certain asymmetries.  According to Harvey, such uneven geographic conditions arise as 
wealth and power become concentrated in certain places because of asymmetrical exchange 
relations.  (Harvey, 2003). 
Accumulation by expanded reproduction amounts to capital accumulation as we 
typically see it.  It is production of goods and services.  Harvey defined accumulation by 
dispossession as the "continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx had 
treated as 'primitive' and 'original' during the rise of capitalism."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 43).  
Accumulation by dispossession amounts to robbery, sanctioned and assisted by the state's 
approval of the activities of capital.  Harvey provides examples of this continuation of primitive 
or initial accumulation:  
commodification and privatization of land and the 
forceful expulsion of peasant populations (as in 
Mexico and India in recent times); conversion of 
various forms of private property rights (common, 
collective, state, etc.) into exclusive property rights; 
suppression of rights to the commons; 
commodification of labor power and the 
suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of 
production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, 
and imperialist processes of appropriation of assets 
(including natural resources); monetization of 
exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the 
slave trade (which continues particularly in the sex 
industry); and usury, the national debt, and most 
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devastating of all, the use of the credit system as 
radical means of primitive accumulation. 
 
(Harvey, 2006, p. 43).  Important to our analyses here, Harvey recognizes that the "state, with its 
monopoly of violence and definition of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and 
promoting these processes."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 43).  This dissertation attempts to fill the gap left 
by Harvey when he decided not to undertake an explanation of how the state plays such a crucial 
role. 
Harvey's explanation of accumulation by dispossession is founded upon four 
essential elements.  Those elements are privatization, financialization, the management and 
manipulation of crises, and state redistributions.  (Harvey, 2006, pp. 44-50).  Each element is 
discussed in turn below. 
First, privatization is defined by Harvey as the "transfer of assets from the public 
and popular realms to the private and class-privileged domains."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 45).  Prior to 
Harvey's recent statements on privatization, the definition of privatization had been restricted to 
the transfer of productive public assets from the state to private companies.  (Roy, 2001).  
Harvey's recent expansion of the concept of privatization within the context of accumulation by 
dispossession to include transfers to class-privileged domains is important to the analysis of this 
dissertation and particularly relevant to the expansion of the public use doctrine and the case 
study regarding eminent domain included herein. 
Second, financialization, hallmarked by Harvey primarily as predatory lending 
and speculative investment, is also an element of accumulation by dispossession.  In initially 
developing the concept of accumulation by dispossession as a spinoff of primitive accumulation 
used to avert capitalist crisis, Harvey stressed the importance of  finance.  His definition of the 
elements of accumulation by dispossession underscores that emphasis.  (Harvey, 2006, p. 45). 
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The third element of accumulation by dispossession, as outlined by Harvey entails 
the management and manipulation of crises where there is a deliberate redistribution of wealth 
that makes way for additional accumulation.  Here the state enters Harvey's analysis as he notes 
that "[o]ne of the prime functions of state interventions and of international institutions is to 
orchestrate crises and devaluations in ways that permit accumulation by dispossession to occur 
without sparking a general collapse or popular revolt."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 47).  Harvey does not 
endeavor to reveal the state mechanism that acts behind such orchestration. 
Finally, Harvey identifies state redistributions as the fourth element of 
accumulation by dispossession.  Here he does scratch the surface of how the state intervenes in 
accumulation by dispossession noting that the state employs "redistributive policies" through 
privatization schemes and reduction of state expenditures that provide social support. (Harvey, 
2006, p. 48). 
Harvey asserts that he chose not to expand his theory of accumulation by 
dispossession to intranational situations because of the work on uneven development done by 
Smith.  Therefore, to link accumulation by dispossession to intranational practices, some level of 
reconciliation and linkage with Smith's work on intranational uneven development will be 
required. 
Before exploring further the link between accumulation by dispossession and 
accumulation by expanded reproduction and active state spatial practices, it is necessary to 
understand the dialectical relationship between the state and capital.  That relationship between 
the state and capital is Harvey's "new imperialism," on which both forms of capital accumulation 
depend.  It is the state sponsored geographic dynamics of capital accumulation that make the 
transition between accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction 
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possible.   
This dissertation will examine that dialectical relationship between the state and 
capital and how it interplays with the two forms of accumulation identified by Harvey through 
active, deliberate spatial practices.  Harvey notes that the institutional arrangements of the state 
set the stage for capital accumulation.  The state acts as a territorial framework within which the 
process of capital accumulation operates.  (Harvey, 2003, p. 89).  Capital accumulation 
flourishes within a system of institutional structures of law, private property, contract, and 
security of money form. (Harvey, 2003, p. 89).  However, how the state executes the function of 
establishing and maintaining an institutional structure of law, private property, contract, and 
security of money form remains under-theorized. An understanding of Harvey's accumulation 
strategies is paramount.  
Harvey recognizes that political power is an always unstable mix of coercions, 
emulations, and, relying on Gramsci, the exercise of leadership through the development of 
consent. (Harvey, 2003, p. 42).  Money, productive capacity, and military might are the engines 
that drive these power processes on an international scale.  This dissertation will attempt to 
illustrate that on an intranational scale, the engines that drive the power processes are money, 
productive capacity, and regulatory power.  
While Harvey leaves discussions of imperialism wed to interstate relations, 
imperialist practices are equally evident within states.  Confinement of such intrastate processes 
to a general theory of uneven geographical development misses a quintessential opportunity to 
abstract intrastate practices in terms of the two forms of capital accumulation identified by 
Harvey.   Also, intrastate imperialism provides a good venue for accumulation by dispossession, 
because intrastate regulation is often fundamentally linked to propertied interests. 
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3.2 State Spatial Practices 
An accurate and thorough understanding state spatial practices is essential to 
examining the state's role in uneven development.  This dissertation will focus on two aspects of 
state spatial practices: Harvey's grid of spatial practices and the new concept of flexible 
rescaling.  Harvey's grid of spatial practices is discussed and the concept of flexible rescaling is 
introduced below.  
3.2.1 Harvey's Grid of Spatial Practices 
In addition to analyzing the two forms of capital accumulation, Harvey also 
contributed to the proposed research through his development of a grid of spatial practices.  The 
grid initially was used by Harvey to analyze the spatial practices of individuals, but in this 
dissertation it will be used to analyze state spatial practices.  As used by Harvey, the grid 
examines how people's spatial practices impact their relations with space.   
The grid examines how three different spatial practices work. Those three spatial 
practices are experienced or material spatial practices, perceived spatial practices, and spaces of 
representation or imagined spatial practices.  First, experienced or material spatial practices are 
physical flows and transfers across space and time.  Second, perceived spatial practices are 
representations of space or signs and significations that allow transfers to be understood.  Third, 
imagined spatial practices or spaces of representation are mental inventions of new meanings for 
spatial practices.  More specifically, the grid examines how these three conceptualizations of 
spatial practices impact how people see and use space. 
The grid looks at how people see and use space in four different ways.  These four 
ways space is used are accessibility and distanciation, appropriation of space, domination of 
space, and production of space.   First, accessibility and distanciation is the measure of the 
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degree to which friction of space has been overcome to accommodate social interaction.  Here 
distance is both a barrier to and a defense against social interaction.  Second, appropriation of 
space is how space is taken or assumed by individuals.  Third, domination of space by 
individuals or powerful groups is the legal or extra-legal means to control space.  Last, 
production of space is how new systems and representations are formed.  (Harvey, 1989). 
 
Figure 1: Grid of Spatial Practices. (Source: Harvey, 1989). 
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While to date the use of Harvey's grid has been specific to individual spatial 
practices, examining the grid shows that it can be applied to the spatial practices of the state in 
the context of uneven development.  Harvey provides explanations and examples of how 
different classes of individuals construct their sense of territory and community differently in the 
American city.  (Harvey, 1987).  This dissertation will use the grid to provide explanations and 
examples for how the state uses space.  
3.2.2  Flexible Rescaling 
There has been significant research into rescaling.  Both Smith and Brenner have 
contributed to the literature regarding rescaling.  Smith discussed rescaling as the ability of the 
state to alter the power structure to concentrate power differently.  (Smith, 2003).  In Smith's 
research to date, this alteration of the power structure has been confined to physical rescaling 
where the structure of the state changes with the concentration of power, as happened with the 
creation of the EU.  (Smith, 2003).  Brenner has recognized rescaling as a state spatial practice 
by acknowledging that rescaling is an “active political action to facilitate, manage, mediate, and 
redirect processes of geo-economic restructuring."  (Brenner, 2004, p. 61).  But, like Smith, 
Brenner does not discuss rescaling outside the context of restructuring.    
This dissertation will attempt to take the concept of rescaling beyond the 
boundaries of Smith and Brenner by explaining that the spatial practices of the state can be 
inherently flexible.  The concept of flexible rescaling which will be introduced in this 
dissertation recognizes the ability of the state to rescale without formally restructuring.  If this 
view of the state is adopted, then the state can be seen as capable of mobilizing scale as a spatial 
practice in order to benefit capitalism absent restructuring.   The state could then respond to its 
need to manage power differently without formally restructuring.   
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The problem with formal restructuring is that it might dissolve the state and 
recreate it, thereby creating certain political change and potential political instability.  The state 
tries to avoid this political instability.  This dissertation will argue that the ability to flexibly 
rescale is integral to the state's role in uneven development and to the avoidance of conflict.  This 
proposed ability of the state to rescale without restructuring is an ability built into the framework 
of the state, for use to the benefit of the state and capital when needed.  With flexible rescaling, 
the state has the ability to change the way it regulates without changing the formal fixed scales of 
government and without risking revolution.  
Smith's more recent work on scale reflects a recognition of the "simultaneity of 
scales."   (Smith, 2000).  Smith describes that simultaneity as the interflow between bodily, 
global, and intervening scales where scales are embodied and reconstructed at the same time.  
Smith argues that this simultaneity of scale demonstrates the socially constructed nature of 
scales.  (Smith, 2000).  Smith recognizes scaling (and rescaling) as the product of economic, 
political, and social activities and relationships.  (Smith, 2000).  But, Smith never directly 
recognizes the component of flexibility built into the state's regulatory framework which allows 
for change without formal restructuring.  
One of the overarching points which will be made in the dissertation is that the 
state is flexible, and that flexibility amounts to a spatial practice of the state, the impact of which 
goes largely unnoticed and unconsidered.  The flexibility to devolve power between scales is 
inherent.  No formal restructuring is required to transfer or devolve power.     
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Chapter 4   
Geographic Theorizations to Date Regarding the State and Uneven Development 
 
Certain concepts already have been developed that significantly contribute to the 
current conceptualization of the state's role in uneven development.  Those concepts act as the 
foundation for a more complete theorization of the state's role in uneven development.  This 
dissertation intends to use those existing geographic theorizations regarding the state's role in 
uneven development, as well as to extend beyond their boundaries to make connections not 
before developed.   "To begin with, . . . abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely from 
the abstractions of other thinkers . . ..  There has to be a lot of overlap.  Otherwise, [one will] 
have constructed what philosophers call a ‘private language,’ and any communication between 
[one] and the rest of [the world] would be impossible."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 27).  Therefore, before 
exploring further how the interplay between state spatial practices and capital accumulation 
strategies impacts uneven development, it is first necessary to examine what geographers have 
already said about the state's role in uneven development.   
Many geographers have addressed the functional and institutional roles of the 
state which contribute to theorizations of uneven geographic development.  Only three, however, 
Neil Brenner, Neil Smith, and David Harvey, attempt a theorization of how those roles play out 
as the state's actual role in uneven geographic development.  In fact, in addition to those three, 
the non-geographer Marxist social theorists discussed above, like Milliband and Poulantzas, have 
gone farther toward explaining the role of the state in uneven development than the majority of 
the remaining geographers. 
4.1 The Institutional and Functional Roles of the State 
A discussion of those geographers who have offered explanation of the 
institutional and functional roles of the state, generally, without meaningfully linking the role of 
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the state to uneven geographical development, is required when examining the geographical 
literature on the state's role in managing uneven development.  It is required, because such a 
linkage obviously follows, (Cox, 2004), regardless of the failure of those geographers to 
ultimately make such a linkage.  
More than two decades ago, state theory moved from an instrumentalist 
conception toward a recognition of the complexity and specificity of the state and its distinctive 
organizational nature as a set of apparatuses.  (Blomley, 1988).  Following such a recognition, 
the state was no longer regarded by most merely in an instrumental fashion or simply reduced to 
a functional expression of capitalist imperatives.  Recognition was given by many state theorists 
that the state also has the qualities of an autonomous actor.  (Blomley, 1988). 
Mann identified the power of the state, which arguably underlies the resultant 
uneven development within the state, as twofold.  (Mann, 2003).  Per Mann, these two state 
powers are despotic and infrastructural.  Despotic powers are defined by Mann as the range of 
actions the elite can take without institutional negotiations with civil society groups.  These 
powers are also called the "autonomy of power" of the state elsewhere in the geographic 
literature.  They are the "power over civil society." By contrast, infrastructural powers are 
articulated by Mann as the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society and implement political 
decisions.  According to Mann these are the more common and concerning powers like the 
powers to tax income and wealth, to collect information on the citizenry, to enforce rules and 
regulations instituted by the state, to regulate the economy, and to directly provide for the 
subsistence of at least some citizens (Mann argues most) in the form of state employment, 
pensions, and family allowances.  (Mann, 2003).  This power is the power of the state to 
penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society 
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According to Mann, infrastructural power is strong in relation to individuals and 
weak in relation to groups.  Examples of infrastructural power development given by Mann 
(without any explanation of how those powers are developed) are the central division of labor 
between entities centrally coordinated, the storage power over information and the ability to 
codify laws, the control of coinage and weights and measures and the guarantee of value, and the 
provision of rapid communication and transportation, what Harvey would term structured 
coherence, to society.  (Mann, 2003).  However, Mann's attempts to reduce the possible 
incarnation of the state to four ideal types fails, particularly where imperial states are defined by 
Mann as possessing high despotic and low infrastructural powers.  Such a restriction of power in 
imperial states seemingly is an incorrect denial of significant infrastructural power to imperial 
states. 
Mann identifies the primary functions of the state as all falling under the umbrella 
of rulemaking.  They are the persistent actions of maintaining order, namely protecting the 
propertied classes from the propertyless, military defense in the form of collective action or 
military aggression in the form of action to the benefit of specific interests, the provision of what 
Harvey would call structured coherence, and economic redistribution, including international 
redistribution through market regulation.  Mann suggests that the power to undertake these 
functions arises primarily from the territorial centrality of the state.  (Mann, 2003).   Mann is not 
the only scholar to discuss the state’s actions in detail, however. 
Silvern discusses state regulation in his analysis of American Indian Treaty rights 
juxtaposed against the doctrines of state centrism and equal footing.  (Silvern, 2002).  In 
examining these rights and this regulation, Silvern exposes, consistent with Delaney's analysis, 
that despite the Supreme Court saying that both states and the federal government may regulate 
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use of state space, even in the face of treaties arguably silent on the issue, "to the present time 
there never has been either legal analysis or citation of a non-dictum [or non-binding] authority 
in any decision of the Supreme Court of the Land in support of its decisions holding that state 
police power may be employed to limit or modify the exercise of rights."  (Silvern, 2002, p. 51).  
The state furthers and maintains an impression of its own position both as a 
legitimate and as an autonomous actor within the space-economy and, secondary to this, as an 
efficacious social agent. (Blomley, 1988).   Delaney argues that the legal system is used to these 
ends, to "enlist the power of the state to validate some versions in preference to other competing 
versions."  (Delaney, 2001, p. 490).  By this description of law, we understand law to be one tool 
(if not the primary tool) employed by the state to manage uneven development, regardless of 
scale.  
Given the state's requirement of legitimacy, however, the state must "function and 
appear as an impartial arena, as a site of justice, it must also serve to constrain the power and 
ambitions of national and subnational governments, and thus can serve to recognize and even 
protect" marginalized groups in order to retain requisite legitimacy. (Silvern, 2002, p. 35).  Law, 
therefore, becomes a site of domination and resistance, colonization and decolonization, (Silvern, 
2002, p. 35) . . . a site for uneven development.  Despite these recognitions of the legitimation 
required to maintain the state's power and the general role of the law in securing legitimation, 
how the law mediates to provide such legitimation to the state, as a system, has never been 
theorized.  Instead, scholars to date have recognized that law provides requisite legitimation, but 
they have never undertaken to discuss how, except for the basic recognition that legitimation 
results from the appearance of justice created by the law. 
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4.2 Brenner, Smith, and Harvey on the State and Uneven Development 
 
In critically discussing the state's role in managing uneven development, it is 
instructive to examine the state's role in two regards: first, with regard to the state's role in 
managing classic uneven regional development as theorized by Neil Brenner and Neil Smith, and 
to some extent by Harvey, and, second, with regard to the state's role in managing accumulation 
strategies.  While Harvey has restricted his analysis of accumulation strategies and accumulation 
by dispossession to international imperialism, his analysis of capital accumulation strategies can 
be expanded to intranational imperialism where the state's role has yet to be sufficiently 
theorized. 
Brenner, Smith, and Harvey all have made significant contributions to the 
geographic literature by taking us beyond the traditional institutional and functional roles of the 
state to examine some aspects of the linkages between the state and uneven development.  
Briefly stated, Brenner posits that the state's role in uneven development is twofold: first, the 
state acts as a form of territorialization for capital and, second, the state acts as an institutional 
mediator of uneven geographical development on differential, overlapping spatial scales.  
(Brenner, 1998).  Finding scale to be absolutely central to the processes and politics of uneven 
geographical development, Smith generally posits that the state's role in uneven development is 
to form the territorial container for social action, thus defining territorial scale and creating a 
foundation where uneven geographical development can occur.  (Smith, 1990).  Both of these 
geographers obviously build primarily on the Marxist state theories of Poulantzas, Milliband, and 
Gramsci.   Lastly, Harvey generally defines the state as a power arising from, but placed above, 
society to moderate conflict between the classes which becomes the locus of power by which 
class domination through law, taxation, and coercion can occur.  (Harvey, 1978). From this 
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definition he develops the state's role in varying forms of capital accumulation resulting in 
uneven development as the role to hold a monopoly of violence and a definitional power over 
legality, thereby playing a crucial role in backing and promoting the processes of accumulation.  
(Harvey, 2003). 
4.2.1   Brenner on the State's Role in Uneven Development 
Brenner's earlier work connects the state's spatial attributes of "spatial tactics" and 
"spatial targets" to uneven development by noting that the state tolerates and even encourages 
uneven development as cities and regions participate in competition over capital development 
and accumulation strategies (Brenner, 1997a).  Brenner has written at length regarding the 
spatiality of the state, with questionable success.  However, only Brenner's earlier connections to 
uneven development are addressed herein.  This dissertation seeks to further Brenner's earlier 
work and to correct his later misadventures into state spatiality.   
Brenner sees the key roles of the state as acting as a form of territorialization for 
capital and acting as an institutional mediator of uneven geographical development on 
differential, overlapping spatial scales.  (Brenner, 1998).    For Brenner forms of territorialization 
of capital are always scaled.  These scales circumscribe the social relations of capital within 
determinate, but highly contested, geographical boundaries and "hierarchize" them (the social 
relations) within relatively structured, although uneven and asymmetrical, patterns of 
sociospatial interdependence.  (Brenner, 1998).  Loosely theorized, state scaling contributes to 
uneven geographical development.  Brenner develops this theory by relying on and extending 
LeFebvre.  According to Brenner (1997b), who argues that the state scales to manage uneven 
development, 
[t]erritorial states are confronted with new regulatory problems as 
their 'internal' spaces are continuously remolded through new 
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patterns of industrialization, urbanization, regional development, 
underdevelopment, and socio-spatial polarization of different 
geographical scales.  To regulate these new mosaics of socially 
produced geographical unevenness, the territorial state deploys a 
wide range of geographically specific policies oriented toward 
different cities, industrial districts, regions, growth poles, 
peripheries, 'underdeveloped' zones, rural areas, and so forth.  In 
each case, Lefebvre argues, the state strives to construct 'a 
hierarchical ensemble of places, functions and institutions,' a task 
that at once entails biological reproduction, the reproduction of the 
labor force, the reproduction of the means of production, and the 
reproduction of the social relations of production and domination. 
 
Brenner notes that LeFebvre argues that the state mode of production must be 
understood as both a form of territorialization for capital and also as the most important 
institutional mediator of capital's uneven geographical development on multiple intertwined 
scales, a traditionally Marxist view of the state.  (Brenner, 1998).  The state’s delicate 
equilibrium for capital is then primarily based on the state’s ability to command and control scale 
within its territorial space.  (Brenner, 1998).  Brenner identifies that the state uses space or scale 
as its privileged instrument to impact the relations between individuals, groups, class fractions, 
and classes. (Brenner, 1998).  But how these scales are managed remains a mystery in Brenner's 
writings.  What we do know from Brenner is that "[t]he contours of this uneven geography are 
not inscribed permanently onto the institutional landscapes of capitalism, but are reworked 
continually through capital's restless development dynamic and through successive political 
strategies to subject it to some measure of regulatory control," arguably an allusion to flexibility, 
although it remains more likely that Brenner was referring to a more classical restructuring when 
he referenced such a "reworking."  (Brenner, 2004, p. 13-14).   
Brenner acknowledges that uneven geographical development is, therefore,  
associated with new profit-making opportunities for capital and also with potentially 
destabilizing, disruptive effects that erode the socio-territorial preconditions for sustainable 
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capital accumulation.  (Brenner, 2004).  Capitalist expansion and development can be dangerous 
even for capitalism because of its uneven formulations.  While capitalist strategies of 
deterritorialization can succeed in circumventing some constraints imposed by national 
boundaries, they do not translate into true hyper mobility and placelessness and therefore are 
unsuccessful at alleviating the perils of uneven geographical development.  (Brenner, 2004, p. 
59). 
4.2.2 Smith on the State's Role in Uneven Development 
Smith has long focused on scale and uneven geographical development, linking 
the two through the state.  He notes that "the demarcation of scale should be seen as absolutely 
central to the processes and politics of uneven geographical development."  (Smith, 2003).  
Because the state forms the territorial container for social action, thus defining territorial scale, it 
creates a foundation where uneven geographical development can occur.  When scalar divisions 
within the state are manifested, uneven geographical development is manifested.  (Smith, 2003). 
In his seminal text, Uneven Development, Smith explained the artificial, social 
construction of nature.  While Smith's book falls short of conceptualizing how the state 
accomplishes this construction, he makes the fact that the state has a role in such construction 
clear.  (Smith, 1990).  A decade later, legal geographer David Delaney developed a hypothesis 
that the state's social construction of nature occurred by force of law.  (Delaney, 2001).  Delaney 
also notes that law is enforced by the organized violence of the centralized state, thereby 
extended Mann's theorization that territorial centrality of the state underlies state power,  (Mann, 
2003), and expounding slightly on Smith's linkage of the state and uneven development.  
(Delaney, 2001). 
Smith does dismiss any argument of randomness of geographic unevenness.  
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(Smith, 1990).  Smith argues, instead, that uneven geographic development is the result of 
tensions created by the drive of capitalism to continually accumulate.  More specifically, Smith 
identifies a tension between the tendency of capitalists to attempt to equalize investment across 
space (the tendency to replicate positive accumulation strategies) and the need for capitalists to 
diversify and expand at uneven and unpredictable paces (the result of competition and attempted 
differentiation between capitalists), resulting in an exploitation of space to allow for 
accumulation.  (Smith, 1990).  Capitalists attempt to seek out territorially unique advantages, and 
attempts at technological innovation also result in uneven geographic patterns. (Smith, 1990). 
The functions of the state, according to Smith, with regard to controlling and 
managing uneven development, are twofold.  The state arbitrates in favor of the ruling class, and 
the state divides people for public purposes by their common place of residence. (Smith, 1990).  
This division creates nationalism and localism.  As a result, the state plays a crucial part in 
identity formation.  (Smith, 1990).  This observation by Smith allows us to meaningfully link 
issues of identity, both internal and external, to the state's actions.  Appalachian identity 
formation illustrates this concept, with the state sponsored Appalachian Regional Commission 
continuing to form and impact Appalachian identity through its actions and initiatives. 
Because Smith sees space as a commodity, the state's role in establishing 
territoriality is fundamental to the commodification of space.  Smith opines that spatial properties 
are part of the use value of a commodity.  If we see them as such, then each time the state 
impacts spatiality it impacts commodity value.  Similarly, the spatial integration that takes place 
is fostered by the state.  Capitalism's need to link commodities production through exchange is 
obviously heavily state regulated.  The resultant progressive integration and transformation of 
absolute spaces into relative space identified by Smith is then managed by the state.  The point of 
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departure here is to explain how and why the state accomplishes these goals.   
Smith's conception of the principle of natural advantage (discussed previously) 
may also be impacted directly by state action.  Economic development initiatives and state 
financing impact the potential for uneven development and the potential to transcend it, thus 
underscoring the importance that would later be placed by Harvey on finance. 
As stated, Smith recognizes that three primary state scales emerge.  For him the 
scales are not fixed; they continue to be shaped by capitalist development.  But the internal 
differentiation between the scales is fixed according to Smith.  Once again, the scales he 
identifies are urban, nation-state, and global.  Urban space is used as an absolute space of 
production.  Production is centralized here and determines urban development.  Smith postulates 
that urban space should be viewed as the expansion of the geographic sphere of "abstract labor." 
Labor first expands within urban space and eventually beyond it and then internally 
differentiates. (Smith, 1990).  The nation-state scale is politically determined by a series of 
historical deals, compromises, and wars by or on behalf of the state.  (Smith, 1990).  Capitalism 
is then forced to act within or move beyond the confines of this state established scale.  Smith 
notes that the nation-state scale is rigid and not capable of fluid expansion.  It has both 
centralization and differentiation on a regional level which leads to rising and declining regions.  
The regions are the product of a differentiated nation state.  The global scale is defined by Smith 
as the world market.  (Smith, 1990).  It universalizes wage labor and attempts to equalize.  Its 
definition is also political, despite its lack of a unified state body.  It is responsible for the 
production of class relations.  Capital attempts to convert these spaces into places of production 
and accumulation as well as a location for consumption, but frequently, according to Smith, 
capital is unable to do so because of the inherent difficulties in attempting to make global spaces 
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places of consumption while maintaining the underdevelopment that results in accumulation on a 
grand scale.  At all three scales the state impacts uneven development and capitalism because of 
its roles in defining and redefining spatial and scalar state properties. 
4.2.3 Harvey on the State's Role in Accumulation Strategies and Uneven 
Development 
 
Before the New Imperialism (Harvey, 2003) was written, and contemporaneous 
with the proliferation of state theory, Harvey analyzed the Marxian theory of the state.  This 
analysis appears to be Harvey's first implicit connection between the state and uneven 
geographical development.  Harvey defined the Marxian state as a power arising from, but 
placed above, society to moderate conflict between the classes which becomes the locus of 
power by which class domination through law, taxation, and coercion can occur.  (Harvey, 
1978).  Such class domination is the heart of uneven geographic development, and the power of 
the state articulated by Harvey to do so links the two. 
In the 1980's Harvey expanded on Marx's identification of the propensity of 
global capitalism to attempt to "annihilate space by time."  Harvey further theorized the 
contemporaneous orientation of capital to geographically expand and temporally accelerate.  
(Harvey, 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1989; recognized by Brenner, 2004).  Harvey premised the 
ability to overcome space on the ability of capital to produce space, a process in which the state 
becomes intimately involved.  (Harvey, 1985).  Based on these assumptions, Harvey identifies 
the "spatial fix" and, even prior to Brenner, recognizes the propensity of capital to attempt 
continual restructuring as a result. (Harvey, 1985). 
Harvey had earlier recognized the still persistent need for the state to appear 
independent and autonomous by defining an "illusory common interest" to foster consent, 
(Harvey, 1978) a theory more fully developed later by the New Imperialism.  The key function 
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of the state, in this regard, is to organize and guarantee certain benefits for labor which are not 
immediately beneficial to capital, but which ultimately will allow capital to further subordinate 
and dominate.  Such benefits are guaranteed in exchange for allegiance by the subordinate 
classes.  Harvey opines that international imperialism can be used to guarantee these benefits 
while gaining intranational allegiance.  (Harvey, 1978).  While he never postulates that 
intranational imperial practices may also be used to gain allegiance, such a theoretical extension 
is logical. 
Harvey identified four basic functions which must be fulfilled by the state to 
support a capitalist system: creation of juridical individuals, creation and maintenance of a 
system of private property rights, determination of standard value, and creation of reciprocal 
dependence in exchange.  He postulated that the performance of these functions would help to 
control the conflict between capital and labor, (Harvey, 1978) thereby allowing uneven 
development to persist. 
Later, in the New Imperialism, in discussing the state's role in accumulation by 
dispossession, Harvey notes that the state, which holds a monopoly of violence and holds 
definitional power over legality, plays a crucial role in backing and promoting the processes of 
accumulation of dispossession.  This role of the state is evident both as those processes are 
articulated by Marx to be the primitive accumulation processes of:  
the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful 
expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms 
of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive 
private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons; 
the commodification of labor power and the suppression of 
alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; 
colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of 
assets (including natural resources); the monetization of exchange 
and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade; and usury, the 
national debt, and ultimately the credit system. . . 
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and as those processes are articulated additionally by Harvey. (Harvey, 2003, p. 145).  Harvey 
contends that Marx's sketch of processes of primitive accumulation remains viable, but he finds 
the processes of manipulating the credit system and finance capital to play an even larger role in 
the continuing process of accumulation by dispossession than in the process of original primitive 
accumulation.  Harvey identifies new processes as well, such as the commodification of cultural 
forms, histories, and intellectual creativities as well as usurpation of intellectual property rights 
and biopiracy.  (Harvey, 2003).  In addition, the creation of private property rights and use of 
state power to create and enforce those rights also can account for accumulation by 
dispossession. 
The reason state intervention is so important in the process of accumulation by 
dispossession is that the state's assistance is required to orchestrate a devaluation of assets or 
labor in such a way as to permit accumulation by dispossession to occur while preventing a 
general economic collapse from happening.  The state is also needed to create the essential link 
between accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction.  The state 
coordinates both processes to the benefit of the same capital powers. 
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Chapter 5 
Ollman’s Dialectical Method 
 
The dialectical method will be used in this dissertation to make the essential 
connections between state spatial practices and capital accumulation which hopefully will 
illuminate the state's role in uneven development.  The dialectical method places emphasis on 
process, internal relations, and contradictions.  The method approaches systems as if those 
systems are in a constant state of change and flux.  Problems with how we have historically 
studied the world are compounded by an approach that privileges whatever makes things appear 
static and independent over their more dynamic and systemic qualities.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 10).  
In this regard, state space has been privileged over state spatial practices.  The dialectical method 
restructures our thinking about reality by replacing our common sense notions of things as 
having a history and external connections with other things with the concepts of process and 
relation, the focus being on internal relations.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 10).  "Dialectics avoids the 
more mechanistic and reductionist versions of this problem and permits the issue to be 
approached theoretically in an open and fluid way."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 76).  The method has a 
relational ontology. (Merrifield, 1993). 
In its essential form, the dialectical method involves employing a process called 
abstraction to move beyond appearances and understand the important relationships and 
connections between things.  "Dialectics, and in particular that version of it which stresses 
internal relations, is perpetually negotiating the relation between the particular and the universal, 
between the abstract and the concrete."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 76).  
"[D]ialectical research begins with the whole, the system, or as much of it as one 
understands, and then proceeds to an examination of the part to see where it fits and how it 
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functions, leading to a fuller understanding of the whole from which one has begun." (Ollman, 
1993, p. 12).  This method starts with the real concrete, defined as the world as it presents itself 
to us, and proceeds through abstraction or the intellectual activity of breaking the whole down 
into manageable mental units we can use to think about and understand the whole, through the 
thought concrete, which Marx defines as the reconstituted whole which then can be understood 
as a new whole.  Every piece gets pulled from the whole, examined, and temporarily perceived 
as standing apart.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 24). 
Ollman provides a clear and useful example for understanding the process of 
abstraction.  He notes: 
In listening to a concert, for example, we often concentrate on a 
single instrument or recurring theme and then redirect our attention 
elsewhere.  Each time this occurs, the whole music alters, new 
patterns emerge, each sound takes on a different value, etc.  How 
we understand the music is largely determined by how we abstract 
it. 
 
(Ollman, 1993, p. 25). 
Dialectical research traces four types of relations.  Dialectical research also uses 
three modes of abstraction to examine the elements of a given whole.  Both the relations and the 
process of abstraction require further explanation. 
5.1 Four Dialectical Relations 
A dialectical relation is essentially a way of examining how some element of the 
whole relates to the whole or to other elements of the whole.  The dialectical method identifies 
four different dialectical relations.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 13).  Those four dialectical relations are: 
1. Identity/difference; 
2. Interpenetration of opposites; 
3. Quantity/quality; and  
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4. Contradiction. 
Each dialectical relation is explained briefly in succession below. 
5.1.1 Identity/Difference 
The first dialectical relation, identity/difference, is what Ollman terms the 
"perspectival element."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 14).  It recognizes that things appear differently 
depending on the perspective of the viewer.  The identity of something is different depending on 
who sees it.  In this respect, Ollman notes that Marx privileged the perspective of the worker.  
(Ollman, 1993, p. 14).  Identity is essential to the forthcoming discussion of the extension aspect 
of abstraction.  In embodies the sameness and difference of parts being analyzed, often with at 
least some portion of that sameness and difference existing simultaneously. 
When "viewing parts as necessary aspects of each other, they become identical in 
expressing the same extended whole."  We must first view abstracted parts as identical even 
before they have been abstracted from the whole.  Examining them as identical aspects before 
they are abstracted from the whole ensures their unity.  "Identity precedes difference."  (Ollman, 
1993, p. 43).  Differences, though, when ultimately found do not destroy the identical nature of 
the parts.  They do not create a problematic contradiction, they only allow us to better understand 
the true nature of the whole from which they have been abstracted.  "Hence, the coexistence of 
identity and difference."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 43). 
5.1.2. Interpenetration of Opposites 
The second dialectical relation, the interpenetration of opposites, refers to the 
situation of things in place and time.  The relation recognizes that "nothing- no event, institution, 
person, or process- is simply and solely what it seems to be at a particular place and time."  
(Ollman, 1993, p. 14).  Rather, if viewed under different conditions, the same thing may appear 
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or actually be different than it seemed.  This relation urges us to examine where and how change 
has already occurred and under what still-developing conditions new changes are likely to occur 
as a means of both gauging the complexity of the part [here the conceptual element of the state] 
and of determining its dependence on the evolution of the system. 
5.1.3. Quantity/Quality 
The third dialectical relation, quantity/quality, refers to change over time.  This 
relation brings into single focus the before and after aspects of development.  "Initially, 
movement within any process takes the form of quantitative change.  One or more of its aspects . 
. . increases or decreases in size or number.  Then, at a certain point . . . a qualitative 
transformation takes place indicated by a change in its appearance or function."   (Ollman, 1993, 
p. 15).  Ollman notes that at this point of transformation in both quantity and quality what you 
are examining "has become something else while, in terms of its main constituting relationships, 
remaining essentially the same."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 15).   
Quantity/quality are important to the examination of both capital accumulation 
strategies and flexible rescaling.  Quantity/quality is a historical movement whereby one or more 
aspects of what something is change in quantity.  The aspects get larger or smaller and increase 
or decrease in number until the aspect attains "critical mass" and a qualitative transformation 
occurs.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 49).  In essence, once one aspect of a process or relation gets big 
enough or small enough, it changes the appearance and composition of the process or relation 
from which it was abstracted, and a qualitative change in what the process or relation is can be 
seen. 
5.1.4. Contradiction 
The fourth, and final, dialectical relation, contradiction, is the most important of 
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the four relations.  Contradiction can be understood as the incompatible development of different 
component parts which are at the same time dependent on one another.  Ollman notes that 
dialectics "attribute[s] the main responsibility for all change to the inner contradictions of the 
system or systems in which [change] occurs." (Ollman, 1993, p. 17).  Contradiction, then, 
focuses research on the internal contradictions within a given process, and dialectics focuses on 
internal relations.  Contradiction includes both elements of historical movement and elements of 
organic movement.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 50). 
Contradiction encompasses five different "movements."  Those five movements 
are mutual support, mutual undermining, eminent unfolding, change in overall form through 
interaction, and resolution.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 51-52).  Ollman contends that the first two 
movements are the most important, because each places a constant pulling in the opposite 
direction.  "The uneasy equilibrium that results lasts until one or the other of these movements 
predominates."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 51).  These two movements are at the heart of both the 
transition between capital accumulation strategies and flexible rescaling.  
The third movement, eminent unfolding, reflects a sharpening or intensifying of 
the first two movements, not necessarily to the same degree.  The growth of the system as a 
whole leads to the growth of these contradictions as well.  The contradictions become more 
obvious and stark as they growth within the system, and they become the elements most 
observable at this point in the movements.   
The fourth movement results from the powerful growth of the third. This fourth 
movement is when change in the overall form occurs as the first two movements play themselves 
out.  Ollman notes this movement can occur when the systemic interactions are the same but the 
entire contradiction gets metamorphosized.  The fifth and final movement then occurs "in its 
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resolution when one side overwhelms what has hitherto been holding in check, transforming both 
itself and all its relationships in the process."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 52). 
Ollman labels the way dialectics deals with change as the "double movement 
(organic and historical) of the capitalist mode of production."  Recall that quantity and quality 
was referred to above as an historical movement, and contradiction was referred to above as 
having elements of both organic and historical movements.  Ollman breaks that organic and 
historical double movement down into a number of sub-movements, some of which are 
synonymous with the four dialectical relations discussed above.  His sub-movements include 
quantity/quality (discussed above), metamorphosis, and contradiction (discussed above), which 
he contends are the three most important, plus mediation, interpenetration of opposites (also 
discussed above), negation of negation, precondition and result, and unity and separation.  
(Ollman, 1993, p. 48). 
Because Ollman contends that metamorphosis is one of the most important sub-
movements of the double movement, it is important to understand that sub-movement as well.  
Metamorphosis examines organic movements of interaction within a system "in which qualities 
(occasionally appearances, but usually functions) of one part get transferred to other parts so that 
the latter can be referred to as forms of the former."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 49).  In metamorphosis, 
"a process is abstracted that is large enough to include both what is changing and what it is 
changing into," thereby implicating the process of abstraction of extension.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 
49). 
In this dissertation, both capital accumulation strategies and state spatial practices 
each will be analyzed in terms of the dialectical relations, movements, and submovements 
identified and discussed above.  This analysis will be performed through use of the modes of 
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abstraction explained below as a means of better theorizing the state's role in uneven 
development and making connections between state spatial practices and uneven development.  
While these analyses will be perceptible, so as to avoid too positivist of a presentation, their 
inclusion will not be explicit. 
5.2 Three Modes of Abstraction 
A mode of abstraction is actually how you go about examining a particular 
concept.  It differs from a dialectical relation in that instead of being the way a component part 
relates to others or the whole, a mode of abstraction involves how we figure out the way 
component parts relate to one another or the whole.  Ollman notes that the process of abstraction 
actually comprises these three "modes of abstraction" or "aspects of abstraction."  Those modes 
or aspects are: 
1. Extension;  
2. Level of generality; and 
3. Vantage point.  
(Ollman, 1993).  Each mode of abstraction is explained in succession following a discussion of 
the process of abstraction generally.   
In the process of abstraction Marx allows the researcher to break down the whole 
into mental units with which we think about it as a means of reconstituting that whole in a way 
that can be understood. (Ollman, 1993, 24).  "In one sense, the role Marx gives to abstraction is 
simple recognition . . . that all thinking about reality begins by breaking it down into manageable 
parts."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 24).   Through abstraction "a piece [is] pulled from or taken out of the 
whole and is temporarily perceived as standing apart." (Ollman, 1993, p. 24).  "In 'abstraction' 
we have simply separated out, focused, and put emphasis on certain common features of these 
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other processes."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 25-6).  Therefore, this dissertation separates the concepts of 
capital accumulation strategies and state spatial practices out from the concept of uneven 
development.  This separation is being made, because it is thought that dialectical examination 
and the resulting understanding of capital accumulation strategies and state spatial practices will 
allow what Ollman identified here as their "certain common features," to foster a new 
understanding of the state's role in uneven development.  
5.2.1. Extension 
The first mode of abstraction, extension, deals with the spatial and temporal 
framework placed around the part abstracted.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 39).  While abstracting 
boundaries and limits in time, extension, like abstraction generally takes us from the concrete 
whole into abstracted parts and back to a mental recreation of the whole.  It breaks the whole into 
pieces and then puts the pieces back together again.  In doing so, abstraction of extension focuses 
on the qualities of identity and difference.   
In this dissertation extension has already been employed to parse out two 
conceptual elements for study.  Once such an abstraction is made, Ollman reminds us that Marx 
terms the abstracted elements "form," which Ollman notes is "Marx's chief way of telling us that 
he has found an identity in difference. [Things are at the same time different and part of the same 
whole.]"  (Ollman, 1993, p. 43).  In this dissertation an identity in difference has been found 
between state spatial practices and capital accumulation strategies, such that each can be treated 
as a form, both separately (recognizing their differences from one another) and wholly 
(recognizing that they are constituent parts of the uneven development of the state at the same 
time).    
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5.2.2. Level of Generality 
The second mode of abstraction, level of generality, refers to the process of 
extracting the general and specific characteristics from parts of the whole.  Then the similarities 
and differences between specific and general characteristics are noted.  Level of generality "is a 
move from a more specific understanding . . . that brings into focus the whole network of equally 
specific qualities in which it functions to a more general understanding . . . that brings into focus 
the equally general state of those conditions in which it occurs."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 54).   
Marx subdivides the world into seven major levels of generality.  Marx organizes 
everything according to one of these seven levels.  The levels are what is: 
1.  Unique to a person and situation; 
2.  General to a person and situation; 
3.  Capitalist; 
4.  Class Society; 
5.  Human Society; 
6.  The animal world; and 
7.  Qualities as a material part of nature. 
Level one, what is unique to a person and situation is exemplified by proper 
names and addresses.  Here whatever makes someone unique is brought into focus for as long as 
it lasts as a unique quality, then the transformation to level two, where generalities begin, takes 
place.  At level two, abstracted into focus are the qualities that make us speak of an individual or 
situation in terms of classes, for Marx "as an engineer or in terms of some other occupation that 
has emerged in modern capitalism."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 55).  Bringing these more general 
qualities into focus then focuses us on what is at its most basic common among the individuals or 
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situations examined at level one. 
Level three is confined to capitalism.  "[E]verything that is peculiar to people, 
their activity, and products due to their appearance and functioning in capitalist society is 
brought into focus."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 55).  This level allows Marx to look at typical works and 
beyond individuals and occupations.  Level three broadens not only characteristics but time.  It 
includes everyone that has taken part in the capitalist system over the history of capitalism.  Of 
course debate remains as to when a capitalist system emerged.  (See Generally, Dunaway, 1996). 
Levels four, five, and six continue to progress through the levels of generality of 
class society, human society, and the animal world.  They occur as the middle of Marx's 
continuum from specific to general.  Level four focuses on the period of history where society 
can still be divided into classes based on their division of labor.  Level five brings into focus 
qualities of people that result from the human condition as a common denominator.  Level six 
broadens the generality even further to remove society from the equation, replacing it with a 
focus on the characteristics of "life functions, instincts, and energies" that are not common to just 
the human population, but which extend outward into the living world more generally.  (Ollman, 
1993, p. 56).  Level seven is the most general of the levels of extension which focuses on even 
more general characteristics of being such as weight and extension. 
[E]ach level, beginning with seven, establishes a range of possibilities for what 
can occur on the more specific levels that follow."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 65).  The significance of 
level of generality is found in the realization that "all the problems from which we suffer and 
everything that goes into solving them or keeping them from being solved is made up of qualities 
that can only be brought into focus on one or another of these different levels of generality."  
(Ollman, 1993, pp. 56-7).  Therefore, "it is essential, in order to understand any particular 
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problem, to abstract a level of generality that brings the characteristics chiefly responsible for 
this problem into focus."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 57).  We need to look at different levels of 
specificity to make valid determinations about anything we are examining.  We must place any 
relation we intend to examine at the proper level of generality for its examination to be accurate, 
but there are movements that can be found or recognized regardless of the level of generality 
chosen.  These movements are referred to as "laws of the dialectic."  Three of the four laws of 
the dialectic have already been discussed: interpenetration of opposites, quantity/quality, and 
contradiction.   
The fourth law of the dialectic is negation of negation.  Negation of negation is 
also one of the dialectical movements within the historical and organic double movement Ollman 
identifies.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 48).  Negation of negation has not yet been discussed.  It occurs 
when "the most recent phase in a development that has gone through at least three phases will 
display important similarities with what existed in the phase before last."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 64).  
"[T]he laws of the dialectic do not in themselves explain, or prove, or predict anything, or cause 
anything to happen.  Rather, they are ways of organizing the most common forms of change and 
interaction that exist on any level of generality for purposes of study and intervention into the 
world of which they are part." (Ollman, 1993, p. 65). 
Consistent with Ollman's directives with regard to level of generality, geographers 
Cox and Mair have recognized that, "[d]iscarding more abstract concepts seems [] to be at least 
as dangerous as any tendency to work at too high a level of abstraction." (Cox and Mair, 1989, p. 
125).   While they have stated their preference to construct a network of concepts that refers to 
various aspects of the local, their urgings are relevant at any scale and are relevant to the level of 
generality mode of abstraction as a whole. (Cox and Mair, 1989).  While they noted the 
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significance of conceptualizing locality in terms of hierarchical levels of abstraction, the same 
strategy can be employed regardless of scale.  This strategy is integral to, if not synonymous 
with, the level of generality mode of abstraction. 
5.2.3. Vantage Point 
The third mode of abstraction, vantage point, is essentially the "place from which 
to view the elements of any particular relation and, given its then extension, from which to 
reconstruct the larger system of which this relation belongs."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 68).  Vantage 
point recognizes that things are different depending on perspective.  Simply put, vantage point 
recognizes that where and how close you are looking at something makes a definite difference in 
what you see.  Dialectics "takes change as the given and treats apparent stability as that which 
needs to be explained and [] provides the specialized concepts and frameworks to explain it."  
(Ollman, 1993, p. 3). 
Vantage point may be the mode of abstraction that explains the differing Marxist 
theories of the state discussed earlier that have evolved over time.  Apparent contradictions in 
Marx's theory of the state may be resolved by recognizing their different, or even diametrical, 
vantage points.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 67-8).  Vantage point results in the creation of a "perspective 
that colors everything which falls into it, establishing order, hierarchy, and priorities, distributing 
values, meanings, and degrees of relevance, and asserting a distinctive coherence between the 
parts." (Ollman, 1993, p. 67-8). 
Because of the nature of abstractions of extension and level of generality, as each 
changes or is revised the vantage point will undergo a corresponding change.  Put simply, if the 
abstraction of extension is larger, then more can be seen from the resulting vantage point, and 
connections may be observed which would be excluded from a narrower extension and a 
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correspondingly narrower vantage point.   
Abstraction of vantage point is import to the identification of identity and 
difference.  Just as a broad enough abstraction of extension is required to encompass the 
simultaneity of identity and difference, without an appropriate vantage point, the simultaneity 
would be impossible to observe.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 73).   "[O]ne's ability to actually see and 
therefore to examine either set of qualities depends on the vantage point adopted for viewing 
them."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 73).  "Even when the shift in vantage point appears to be slight, the 
difference in the perspective opened up can be considerable." (Ollman, 1993, p. 73).   Ollman 
notes that change is typically seen as "a comparison of two or more differentiated states in the 
development of the object or condition or group under examination."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 29).  
Here dialectics, instead, urges us to examine the same state from different views rather than 
different states from the same view but at different times.  This distinction is foundational to the 
dialectical method.  Marx allows us to alter these abstractions throughout the examination when 
undertaking this examination.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 42). 
 5.3 Examples of the Use of Dialectics in Geography 
Having examined all three modes or aspects of abstraction, it is important to note 
that each is relevant not only to the abstraction of the parts but also to the recreated whole.  That 
is, conclusions drawn from a particular abstraction of extension at a particular level of generality 
likewise must be viewed at the same extension and level of generality in order to be understood, 
evaluated, and revised.  (Ollman, 1993, p. 61).  While more than one level of abstraction can be 
simultaneously considered, it will be necessary to be careful not to mix abstractions of extension 
and/or abstractions of level of generality in putting the dialectical method to use in this 
dissertation.  "In practice, these three decisions (really, three aspects of the same decision) as to 
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extension, level of generality, and vantage point are usually made together and their effects are 
immediate, though on any given occasion one or another of them may appear to dominate."  
(Ollman, 1993, p. 69). 
In attempting to use these three modes of abstraction, the work of others is also 
instructive.  Sayer's work urging the adoption of post disciplinary studies is relevant in that the 
dialectical abstraction involved herein will necessarily cross disciplinary boundaries. (Sayer, 
2003).  First, Sayer proposes avoiding reductionism and inappropriate causal attributions by 
dismissing the primacy of disciplines and whether ideas can be identified with any particular 
one. (Sayer, 2003).  Such an analysis allows reference to and reliance upon literature outside 
human geography as additional support for the dialectical abstractions which will be attempted 
by this dissertation.  Issues related to the state and uneven development logically cannot be 
restricted to the discipline of geography, and making connections with literature outside 
geography is an opportunity which should not be missed. Ollman notes that Marx would urge us 
to incorporate existing work into our abstractions, lest we be trapped in isolation.  (Ollman, 
1993, p. 27).  
Consistent with Sayer's suggestion to follow ideas and connections wherever they 
lead instead of following them only as far as the border of their discipline, this dissertation will 
transcend traditional boundaries of uneven development literature and geographical literature 
regarding the state to incorporate into the attempted dialectical abstractions, relevant work 
regardless of disciplinary boundaries.  (Sayer, 2003).  Existing literature will be critically 
reviewed and analyzed, and connections made between theoretical advancements to date, in an 
effort to reveal the full potential of the dialectical method. 
As further justification for the use of dialectics in this dissertation, Ollman 
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appropriately notes that "reality is more than appearances, and that focusing exclusively on 
appearances, on the evidence that strikes us immediately and directly, can be extremely 
misleading."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 11).  He continues that "understanding anything in our everyday 
experience requires that we know something about how it arose and developed and how it fits 
into the larger context or system of which it is a part."  (Ollman, 1993, p. 11).  For Ollman 
concludes that: 
After all, few would deny that everything in the world is changing 
and interacting at some pace and, in one way or another, that 
history and systemic connections belong to the real world.  The 
difficulty has always been how to think about them, how not to 
distort them, and how to give them the attention and weight they 
deserve.  Dialectics is an attempt to resolve this difficulty by 
expanding our notion of anything to include, as aspects of what it 
is, both the process by which it has become and the broader 
interactive context in which it is found. 
 
(Ollman, 1993, p. 11).  Such a focus on process and connections is well suited for incorporation 
of Massey's work on networks and Howitt's work on relations into the analysis in this 
dissertation.  
Massey's work is closely tied to spatial practices.  Her examination of the tensions 
between the political, the cultural, and the economic, what she terms the "geometries of power," 
is important to the definition of spatial practices.  (Massey, 1993).   Swyngedouw recognized 
these geometries in his own work.  (Swyngedouw, 1997). 
Like Ollman, Massey rejects traditional theoretical boundaries of analysis.  She 
sees conceptualizations that are constructed in an introverted, inward-looking, historical way 
based on origins and that require the drawing of boundaries as problematic.  Instead, she 
recognizes that like people, places have multiple identities.  (Massey, 1993).   These identities 
may be implicated in the state's control of and influence over uneven development.  These 
 
 52 
aspects of her work shed light on the tensions brought about by rescaling. 
Massey's alternative interpretation suggests examining points in the intersection 
of social relations.  The uniqueness of place, or a locality, for her is formed by particular 
interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, social processes, experiences and 
understandings, in a situation of co-presence, but where a large proportion of those relations, 
experiences, and understandings are actually constructed on a much larger scale than what we 
happen to define for that moment as the place itself, whether that be a street, a region, or even a 
continent.  (Massey, 1993).   Massey urges us to look at moments in networks of social relations. 
(Massey, 1993).  This interpretation is closely tied to the abstraction of vantage point which 
serves as one of the foundational aspects of dialectics. 
Howitt advances that concepts are most meaningful when made real by 
understanding the complex and dynamic relationships and processes in context, a position that, 
like Massey, is closely tied to the examination of spatial practices.  (Howitt, 2003).  Howitt 
recognizes that tension between globalization and locality research was often a product of 
research paradigms that failed to deal with the simultaneity and complexity of power relations, 
identity, and difference that Massey saw as challenging naive notions of space.  (Howitt, 2003).  
Such naive notions of space made any consideration of concepts such as state involvement in 
place building, the politics of identity, power relations, and uneven development impossible, 
because those conceptions of space and scale did not allow for examination of the relations 
between scales.  Howitt argues that it is precisely the failure to undertake meaningful analysis 
across scales that has been problematic in operationalizing scale as a fundamental concept with 
practical rather than merely rhetorical value.  (Howitt, 2003). 
Merrifield's work is more directly connected to state spatial practices.  Neither 
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Massey nor Howitt examine the spatial practices of the state, whereas Merrifield indirectly 
implicates state spatial practices in his examination of the relationships between space and place.   
Merrifield has already successfully used dialectics in the spatial context when he examined 
LeFebvre's spatialized dialectic and theorized the specific dialectics of space and place.  
(Merrifield, 1993, p. 519).  Merrifield argues against a Cartesian viewpoint with its dualism of 
place.  He argues there is no polarity between subjective and objective realms of place.  
(Merrifield, 1993). 
Merrifield provides a foundation for the examination of spatial practices, because 
spatial practices implicate both aspects of space and place.  Traditionally, place has been thought 
of as state constructed (Tuan, 1977).  Merrifield segues us from state constructed place to capital 
space in discussing the capitalist space-place relationship.  (Merrifield, 1993. p. 520-521).  
Merrifield suggests that space is not the abstract with place being more concrete, and he urges us 
to consider space and place together.   
For Merrifield there is no real distinction between circulating and fixed capital;  
they are just different moments in capitalism.  As a result, his theorizations transcend more 
traditional conceptualizations of place.  He notes that when capitalism takes place somewhere, 
capital fixity results which forms "place."  (Merrifield, 1993).  This notation recognizes capital's 
construction of place and capital's identity and difference where capitalism itself is both a thing 
(produced space) and a process.  For Merrifield, social space is a form of production itself.  The 
interpenetration of opposites is recognized when Merrifield notes that this capital form can be 
both a space and a place at the same time.  (Merrifield, 1993). 
Merrifield also sheds light on the production of space and place as spatial 
practices by noting that capitalist space internalizes conflict.  Social forces and social conflict are 
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"inscribed in place," and there is a tension between the use of place for social purposes and for 
domination, as will be seen in the case study of Appalachian land acquisitions.  The bottom line 
is that the relationship between space and place is understood by the relation between fixed and 
circulating capital.  Fixed capital is place.  Circulating capital is in space.  The spatial practices 
that determine where and when each can reside are the subject of this dissertation. 
Ollman notes that a fully adequate theory of the state, which would answer all of 
the important questions, could only be constructed by integrating aspects of the dialectical 
method.  (Ollman, 1993).  In this dissertation, the dialectical method will be applied to capital 
accumulation strategies and state spatial practices to attempt a more complete theorization of the 
state's role in uneven development.  Obviously conceptual development of a comprehensive 
theory of the state would require abstraction of additional elements not selected for inclusion 
herein.  Dialectics is well suited to these two analyses, however.  With regard to the newly 
developed concept of flexible rescaling, the preference of the dialectical method for explanation 
of the various forms change assumes and why it appears to have stopped, instead of a preference 
to explain why something starts to change, is particularly well suited.  "[T]he subject of 
dialectics is change, all change, and interaction, all kinds and degrees of interaction."  (Ollman, 
1993, p. 23).  The changes predicated upon dualistic capital accumulation strategies and brought 
about by flexible rescaling are at the heart of this dissertation.   
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Chapter 6 
A New Examination of the State's Role in Uneven Development 
 
While Brenner, Smith, and Harvey, attempt theorizations of the state's role in 
uneven geographic development, and while non-geographers such as Marxist social theorists like 
Milliband and Poulantzas also attempted to explain the role of the state in uneven development, 
the state’s spatial role remains under theorized.  No geographer or non-geographer has 
adequately explained how the state actively controls uneven development through its spatial 
practices.   
The rise of neo-liberalism has not diminished the importance of the state as many 
both liberal and conservative theorists have surmised.  The state intervenes in the workings of the 
affairs of capital to assist capital just as it always has.  (Harvey, 2006, p. 28).  Such continued 
intervention makes examination of the state's spatial role, and how that role is fulfilled, more 
important than ever.   
The state actively employs rescaling as a spatial practice to control and impact 
uneven development for the benefit of capital, but it does so without formally restructuring.  The 
state employs flexible rescaling inherent in the state system to control uneven development.  
Flexible rescaling is a new concept that explains the state's ability to maintain 
control over influences on capital accumulation to assist capital, particularly in times when 
public consent for its interventions wane.  "The preferred form of governance is that of the 
'public-private partnership' in which state and key business interests collaborate closely together 
to coordinate their activities around the aim of enhancing capital accumulation."  (Harvey, 2006, 
p. 27).  Such partnerships are often accomplished by flexible rescaling.   "[L]arge corporate 
capitalist interests typically collaborate with government power in policy making as well as in 
 
 56 
the creation of new [] institutional arrangements."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 26).  Flexible rescaling 
represents one way that this collaboration is accomplished.  In terms of flexible rescaling, the 
"policy making" referenced by Harvey is an allusion to governmental policy, whether or not 
reduced to written law, which allows the state to intervene in the capital process to the benefit of 
capital.   
The concept of flexible rescaling is equally applicable across scales and for the 
state's assistance with accumulation by dispossession both in its original or primitive form as 
well as when it is used to stave off crisis, as Harvey recognized.  The case studies which follow 
this preliminary conceptual explanation of the concept will develop further, explain, and 
illustrate the workings of flexible rescaling generally through an examination of state supported 
land practices in Appalachia. 
The basic premise of flexible rescaling is that state power cannot always be 
deployed at the same scale to assist capital.  Harvey alluded to flexibility as a harbinger of rescue 
for capital when he noted: 
The free mobility of capital between sectors and 
regions is regarded as crucial to reviving profit rates 
and all barriers to that movement (such as planning 
controls) have to be removed except in those areas 
crucial to "the national interest" (however that may 
be conveniently defined).  The watchword of the 
neoliberal state is, therefore, "flexibility" (in labor 
markets and in the deployment of investment 
capital).  
 
(Harvey, 2006, p. 25).  While here Harvey falls short of extending this flexibility to rescaling of 
the state as an active spatial practice, he alludes to capital's need for flexible rescaling of its own 
actions to ensure continued expansion.  The flexible rescaling of state power proves just as 
necessary and, as will be seen, functions much the same way toward the same ends. 
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Flexible rescaling comes in two forms: stratified shifts in power up and down and 
lateral intra-scaler shifts in power.  While initial deployment of state power, whether by coercion 
or force, may be best placed at one scale, the need may arise (often through public withdrawal of 
consent) to devolve that state power at a different scale to achieve the same goal.  Similarly, 
while it may have been initially sufficient to deploy state power at only one scale, the need may 
arise for additional concurrent pressure or influence from another scale to assist with the 
accumulation process.  The converse is obviously also true: state power imposition from more 
than one scale may be the initial push for assistance to capital, only later for the state to 
recognize that concentration of the state's power at a single scale would be better placed.  The 
inherent flexibility of the system is what allows for these stratified shifts of power up and down  
within the system as well as for lateral transfers of power within a particular scale that also 
amount to flexible rescaling.  Factors that influence these decisions, particularly consent, will be 
explored below. 
As discussed above, it is well established that capital accumulation takes two 
forms: accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction.  Within 
accumulation by dispossession, two distinct forms emerge.  First, the primitive or initial form of 
accumulation by dispossession is long recognized by traditional Marxist theory and will be 
explored here in terms of eminent domain.  Second, in The New Imperialism, Harvey recognized 
a second use for accumulation by dispossession- to stave off crises of over-accumulation once 
accumulation by dispossession has transitioned into accumulation by expanded reproduction, and 
once accumulation by expanded reproduction is firmly underway- and will be explored here in 
terms of mountaintop removal.  Briefly, the need for such  accumulation by dispossession occurs 
when a spatio-temporal fix is not otherwise available to bail capital out of impending crisis.     
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Chapter 7 
State Flexible Rescaling and Land Acquisition: Examples from Appalachia 
 
  Having defined flexible rescaling as the state's ability to maintain control at 
differing scales over influences on capital accumulation to assist capital, particularly in times 
when public consent for its interventions wane, we can look at examples of flexible rescaling in 
Appalachia as an illustration. Three concrete examples of state flexible rescaling in Appalachia 
are examined herein.   
  To better understand these examples, we must recall that from the new theory of 
state flexible rescaling, we know that the state actively flexible rescales in two ways, by action 
and by inaction.  We know that the state does so to benefit capital when power retention at the 
current scale or an anticipated shift in power would not serve the interests of capital.  We also 
know that the system is inherently flexible; that is, the system has the power to change the scale 
of state action without formal restructuring of the state. 
  In examples within Appalachia we can see the state actively flexibly rescaling in 
two ways, by action and by inaction.  First, by action we can see the state taking affirmative state 
actions at one scale when the anticipated scale does not benefit capital.  In such cases, when 
capital expresses or demonstrates a need or a benefit that the state cannot fill at that scale, the 
state will actively shift power up or devolve power down or move power laterally to accomplish 
for capital what capital needs.  Second, similarly, state inactions can amount to state flexible 
rescaling.  In such instances of state inaction, we see the state refusing to act resulting in state 
spatial practices that are inactions.  In such cases, when state inaction occurs at a time when there 
would have been a natural shift in power upward or downward that would not have benefited 
capital, then the state’s inaction amounts to an active state spatial practice that is flexible 
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rescaling. 
  While the examples illustrate these two state spatial practices of action and 
inaction that amount to state flexible rescaling that benefits capital, they also illustrate the 
flexibility inherent in the system.  The examples illustrate the flexibility inherent in the system in 
different ways.  First, the judiciary with its levels of appeal has a built in spatial distribution that 
allows power to move upward by appeals and downward by remands and through Court orders 
mandating further action at a lesser scale.  Second, the executive power system of the local, state, 
and federal government has the same flexibility inherent in the system allowing shifts of power 
within the executive branch between these scales inherent in the system. 
  First, land acquisitions at the time of the early transition from subsistence farming 
toward a more complete industrialization illustrate changes in the executive system that 
facilitated state accumulation by dispossession.  Second, land acquisitions by eminent domain, 
particularly through the definition of public use and the battle for high voltage power 
transmission lines within Appalachia illustrate changes in the judiciary system that facilitated 
additional accumulation by expanded reproduction in Appalachia through devaluation and 
redistribution.  Third, land acquisitions for mountaintop removal illustrate a spatio-temporal fix 
that staved off crisis in industry in Appalachia. 
 7.1 Land Acquisitions Illustrating Flexible Rescaling: Accumulation by 
Dispossession and the Transition to Early Industrialism 
 
The state’s active role in flexibly rescaling is evident during the development of 
accumulation by dispossession in Appalachia during the early transition to industrialism where 
we see two primary state spatial practices at different scales working in tandem to benefit capital: 
first, the state spatial practice of actively creating and maintaining a land recording system at the 
local scale that allowed capital land agents to buy and retain land resources cheaply and that 
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simultaneously created a cheap labor force for capital as a result of the dispossession and, 
second, a state spatial practice at the federal scale where the resulting industrialization is 
regulated by the federal government in a way that reduces competition and allows capital 
expansion through the continued exploitation of that land and labor. 
  Harvey has provided us with examples of accumulation that allow us to examine 
flexible rescaling here.  The early transition examined here was specifically noted within the 
examples he provided.  (Harvey, 2006, p. 43).  Harvey included within his examples of 
accumulation by dispossession "commodification and privatization of land and the forceful 
expulsion of peasant populations" and "commodification of labor power and the suppression of 
alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption." (Harvey, 2006, p. 43).  Harvey 
did recognize that the "state, with its monopoly of violence and definition of legality, plays a 
crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes," but how that role was played was 
never defined before now.  (Harvey, 2006, p. 43).   
  Harvey’s theorization can be extended here where we see the state’s role clearly 
in the example where Appalachian subsistence farmers sold their land to capital’s land agents at 
a local scale who recorded the transactions using recording system created and maintained as a 
state spatial practice at that local scale that benefitted capital.  Those prior land owners then 
transitioned into wage labor, having been dispossessed with the state’s aid at the local scale of 
their most powerful resource- their land.  As they become new wage laborers, we see the state 
flexibly rescale power to continue to benefit capital.  Having exhausted the state’s power at the 
local scale available to benefit capital, those new wage labors are then regulated by a second 
state spatial practice at the federal scale following passage of capital-friendly legislation 
regulating the industrial workplace.  We see the state recalling its power from the local scale to 
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the federal scale to allow additional benefit to capital which would not have been available had 
power not been actively shifted – or flexibly rescaled- by the state.   
  Two state actions, flexibly rescaled from the local scale to the federal scale were 
at play.  On the local scale, land sales made possible and sanctioned by state actions left the land 
behind for the use and benefit of absentee landowner capital as a cheap resource and left the 
inexpensive labor created by dispossessing those landowners at the same time. On the federal 
scale, following the flexible rescaling, the laborers and their working conditions are regulated by 
the federal scale when control at the local scale becomes impractical.  Note here that the flexible 
nature of the system is revealed by the example where the state is not required to restructure in 
order to change the locus of power. 
Specifically exemplified, most generally speaking, during the period from 
approximately the 1880's through approximately the 1930's, like much of Appalachia, West 
Virginia underwent a transformation from a partially agrarian self-sufficiency or "competency" 
state, where development and commercialization was uneven and a lack of transportation, 
capital, and technology was pervasive to a more complete industrialization.  (Lewis, 1998).  By 
1930, most Appalachian income had shifted to non-agricultural employment.  Mountaineers 
were previously living off the land, largely independent of the state’s influences.  But, by 1930 
many had taken jobs in mining, logging, textiles, and public work.  (Eller, 1982, p. xix). 
Appalachian scholar Paul Salstrom argues that the decline of economic self-
sufficiency in Appalachia is also result of land destroying agricultural practices such as slash-
and-burn farming, poor timber practices, the destruction of the Civil War, and New Deal politics. 
(Salstrom, 1997).  Here we can see the state’s actions and inactions at play again though the 
second active state spatial practice referenced above.  The 1933 National Industrial Recover Act 
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(NIRA), a piece of legislation at the national scale, formed an important spatial practice, and the 
subsequent Wagner Act (the National Labor Relations Act) in 1935, another piece of legislation 
at the national scale that formed an important spatial practice, increased coal prices and increased 
wages which, in Appalachia, translated into increased automation of coal loading and decreased 
jobs, slowing the pace of industrialization with regard to workers, but continuing its ascent with 
regard to capital, (Salstrom, 1994).  This state spatial practice at the federal scale of enacting 
national legislation was promoted as helping workers, but it actually helped capital in the end as 
capital found mechanization in the wake of industrial decline.   
While NIRA created the federal public works program, it also allowed the federal 
government through its executive branch to permit concerted capital action and monopoly as a 
means of stimulating the economy.  Specifically, NIRA provided that “the President is 
authorized to enter into agreements with, and to approve voluntary agreements between and 
among, persons engaged in a trade or industry, labor organizations, and trade or industrial 
organizations, associations, or groups, relating to any trade or industry, if in his judgment such 
agreements will aid in effectuating the policy of this title with respect to transactions in or 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”  (NIRA, 1933).  The stated policy of NIRA included 
“remov[ing] obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to 
diminish the amount thereof,” “promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of 
cooperative action among trade groups,” “promot[ing] the fullest possible utilization of the 
present productive capacity of industries,” and “avoid[ing] undue restriction of production.”  
(NIRA, 1933, Sections 1-3). These federal scale spatial practices of allowing monopoly follow 
the stated policy of NIRA, the development of which policy actually exemplifies a state spatial 
practice itself.   
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But the effects of these active state spatial practices of flexibly rescaling power to 
benefit capital were not the only additional state spatial practices ongoing at the time.  If we alter 
our vantage point again, we can see the state’s inaction (itself another active state spatial 
practice) at the federal scale and at the local scale.  This inaction was allowing poor economic 
conditions to persist and allowing uneven development that benefitted capital by maintaining the 
resource pool in under-developed areas to persist.  
Salstrom posits that economic dependency in Appalachia persists even until 
today, because Appalachian farmers were forced, during the period of rapid industrialization, by 
declining living conditions, to take wage earning jobs such as these, illustrating how state spatial 
practices exercised long ago at two differing scales have a continued impact.  (Salstrom, 1997).  
He notes that, as full time farmers, during the late 1800's to early 1900's, they were growing 
poorer.  Salstrom also employs our changed vantage point to alert us to this other state spatial 
practice concurrently at play.  He argues that inept federal scale welfare administration and 
absentee landownership and control negatively impacted Appalachia during the process of 
industrialization.  (Salstrom, 1997).  According to Salstrom, when people needed help on a 
federal scale from the state, it was the state’s inaction that formed a concurrent spatial practice at 
the federal level of allowing deprivation that also forced self sufficient farmers toward capital.  
The lack of federal welfare administered by the national government at that time was a state 
spatial practice at the federal level that forced individuals to work in the coal fields and in the 
factories despite the poor industrial and economic conditions that the prior state spatial practice 
of legislation enactment explained above had created.  This additional spatial practice of inaction 
also allowed capital to use those people as an inexpensive resource, because of their artificially 
created economic need.   
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Specifically, Salstrom argues, with a peripheral rather than a colonial economy 
thesis, that reduced wage demands of Appalachian residents created by the state’s action of 
withholding welfare administration at a local scale had the result of subsidized company wages 
and served to transfer Appalachia's wealth outside of the region.  (Salstrom, 1997).  Here the 
state can be seen rescaling wealth within the capital pool so that uneven economic development 
persists.  Salstrom argues that Appalachia's early regional scale economy benefitted more from 
its prior self-sufficient subsistence farming than its entry into the capitalist money-based 
economy during this period of more rapid industrialization.  (Salstrom, 1997).  However, when 
wage labor failed to support fully the mountaineers as the federal government had through the 
state action of withholding the administration of welfare and mountaineers looked back to family 
farms when industrialization slowed, the industrial economy that the state had supported made a 
profitable return to subsistence farming impossible.  (Salstrom, 1997).  As a result we see this 
concurrent state spatial practice of inaction at play benefitting capital expansion. 
When examining the early industrialism of Appalachia, the flexible rescaling of 
the state actions and inactions that amounted to active state spatial practices can be easily seen 
from a number of different vantage points.  The flexibility inherent in the system is revealed as 
actions at various scales combine to create the dual capital benefit of cheap labor and cheap 
resources that resulted in the transition to industrialism. 
7.2 Land Acquisitions Illustrating Flexible Rescaling: Eminent Domain 
 
If we fast forward to modern day Appalachia, we can more closely examine two 
cases of ongoing dispossession of land and resources which will further illustrate, explain, and 
develop the theory of flexible rescaling conceptualized here.  First, we see classic accumulation 
by dispossession as a means of transferring ownership of resources to allow for classic 
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accumulation by expanded reproduction.  State spatial practices support intrastate shifts in power 
among scales, as illustrated when we examine eminent domain and the expansion of the 
definition of public use as well as its implications for electrical power transmission in 
Appalachia.   
In terms of eminent domain generally, accumulation by dispossession can be seen 
within Appalachia occurring as a predicate to accumulation by expanded reproduction, but 
eminent domain is an even better illustration of the process of flexible rescaling at work.  Recall 
that Milliband refers to the state as an "instrument" or "tool" available for use by capital to 
ensure the maintenance of conditions of uneven development beneficial to capital.  Here we see 
the state used by capital in that way.  When capital was unable to secure land on its own through 
favorable terms that amounted to dispossession, we see capital extend itself into the legal arena 
to secure the state’s assistance in obtaining the devalued property necessary to proceed with 
capital accumulation. 
 7.2.1 TrAIL and High Voltage Transmission Lines in Appalachia 
  
Eminent domain generally, as well as specifically with regard to electric 
transmission lines within Appalachia, acts as an example and helps develop the theory of flexible 
rescaling.  State and capital are intertwined and/or the state is used at varying scales as an 
instrument of capital to promote eminent domain.  Note that once again the flexibility required 
and employed is inherent in the system.  Flexible rescaling, because of its flexible nature, can 
again been seen occurring without requiring formal restructuring of government. 
Eminent domain is best explained by the federal government's most prominent 
recent eminent domain decision handed down: Kelo.  Kelo v. City of New London.  In Kelo, the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision forms a judicial state spatial practice at the federal scale 
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that sanctions the process of taking private land for what is deemed "public benefit."  In Kelo, 
these "benefits" are couched in terms of urban growth and renewal- in short development and 
redevelopment.  In this instance, flexible rescaling, initially seen as the primary justification for 
accumulation by dispossession for purposes of accumulation by expanded reproduction, is both 
justified and sold as beneficial to the public good.  Eminent domain, it should be noted, is one of 
the clearest examples of flexible rescaling, as is the development of many legal issues, because 
the inherent flexibility to rescale is perhaps most transparent when we examine the judicial 
system where power flows more freely and in a logical structure designed to allow such flows. 
“’Public use’ used to have simple meaning in many quarters: A use was public if 
the public used the property.” (Claeys, 2004, p. 2).  Recent case law has seen a retreat from 
“public use” and the development of a sister theory of “public benefit” which allowed broader 
rights for taking land, as well as allowing the development of consent through a new paradigm.  
It was under the “public benefit” shift that the taking of land for urban redevelopment, because 
of blight, and by capital rather than by the state was sanctioned.  We see this “public benefit” 
employed to justify power lines, with a concurrent shifting of power flexibly between scales as a 
state spatial practice to assist capital with accumulation.  Harvey’s grid of spatial practices is 
useful in examining how flexible rescaling occurs. 
If we return here to Harvey’s grid of spatial practices, and apply it to the state, we 
first recall that the grid examines how three different spatial practices work.  (Harvey, 1987).  
Those three spatial practices are experienced or material spatial practices, perceived spatial 
practices, and spaces of representation or imagined spatial practices.  (Harvey, 1987).   Each can 
be applied easily to the state to allow analysis of the state’s active spatial practices and to allow 
development of the theory of flexible rescaling. 
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In terms of the state’s spatial practices, first, experienced or material spatial 
practices are physical flows and transfers made by the state across space and time, illustrated 
here by the transfer of property rights.  Second, perceived spatial practices are representations of 
space or signs and significations put in place by the state that allow transfers to be understood by 
the populace, here the creation of a “public benefit” where either none previously existed or 
where none exists in actuality.  Third, imagined spatial practices or spaces of representation are 
mental inventions of new meanings for spatial practices formed by the populace as a result of 
state imagined spaces as a means of developing or maintaining consent to the state’s spatial 
actions, here the public’s buy-in to the state’s “public benefit.”  In the spaces of representation 
we can see consent develop as the populace shifts from the esoteric theory of “public benefit” to 
an internalized theory of self-benefit.   
We can also use Harvey’s grid to examine how these three conceptualizations of 
spatial practices impact how people and how the state see and use space.  Recall that when 
applied to individuals, the grid looked at how people see and use space in four different ways.  
(Harvey, 1987).  Application of the theory to the four ways the state sees and uses space and to 
the four ways people see and use space as a result of the state’s active spatial practices allows a 
further development of the theory.  These same four ways space is used can be applied to the 
state and to people’s spatial reactions to the state simultaneously. Accessibility and distanciation, 
appropriation of space, domination of space, and production of space can all be applied to the 
state’s active spatial practices within this example, as well as continuing to be simultaneously 
applied to individual spatial practices.    
First, accessibility and distanciation are the measure of the degree to which 
friction of space has been overcome by the state to accommodate capital’s interactions.  As the 
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state rescales, for example from state regulation to federal regulation as we see in the threatened 
state rescaling of power through a shift of approval power for the TrAIL high transmission 
electrical lines from the state public service commissions to the appeal for federal approval of the 
line which was (and remains) waiting in the wings in the event capital’s hopes of expansion are 
dashed by a failure of all involved states to approve, route, and permit the lines in question, 
friction is decreased and public consent grows.  Harvey referred to distance as both a barrier to 
and a defense against social interaction.  (Harvey, 1987).  Here we can see distance or scale used 
as a barrier and a defense to active state spatial practices in the form of regulation.  
Second, appropriation of space is how space is taken or assumed by individuals.  
Here we see how the state’s active spatial practices allow capital to take or assume space through 
the promulgation of rules and case law that allow for eminent domain in circumvention of the 
apparent limitations of the Fifth Amendment.  The state’s approvals (both in terms of allowing 
the process to proceed and in approving the process once it is underway) amount to spatial 
practices that allow space to be taken or assumed by capital for capital’s benefit, whether or not 
couched in terms of public use and/or public benefit.    
Third, domination of space by individuals or powerful groups, as defined by 
Harvey, is the legal or extra-legal means to control space.  There is no explanation required to 
allow the extension of this element to the state’s spatial practices.   
Last, production of space is how new systems and representations are formed.  
Here we see how the individual or populace image of uneven development is molded by active 
state spatial practices that achieve Gramsci’s hegemony through state sanctioned accumulation 
practices. The populace forms a new impression of eminent domain when it is internalized, 
resulting in achievement of consent.   
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Using this spatial grid, and applying it to active state spatial practices, we can 
better use the case of power lines as an illustration as well as to further develop a theory of 
flexible rescaling of power which continues.  When we change our perspective and/or our 
vantage point, the actions of the state can be seen in the same framework developed by Harvey to 
examine individual spatial practices.  When we examine the facts and procedural history of Kelo, 
the applicability of Harvey’s grid to these state spatial practices becomes even more apparent.    
Returning to Kelo, which was introduced briefly previously, recall generally that 
Kelo reaffirmed authority to take private lands for economic purposes.  Specifically, the city of 
New London, Connecticut, used its eminent domain powers to take temporary ownership of 
private property before selling the property to private real estate developers.  
Back in February 1998, Pfizer, Inc. announced that it was developing a global 
research facility on a site adjacent to the neighborhood where Susette Kelo and others lived.  In 
April 1998, the city council of the city of New London granted the request of the New London 
Development Corporation (“NLDC”) to prepare a development plan for the area in question.  It 
should be noted that the NLDC was a private, non-profit corporation formed in 1978, allegedly 
to assist the City in planning economic development for the city.  The plan created included a 
waterfront hotel, a conference center, and approximately 80 new private homes, among other 
“economic developments” denominated as for “public use.”  According to the plan, the NLDC 
would own the land located in the development area but would lease it to private developers for 
$1 per year under a 99 year lease. 
The residents of New London, led by Susette Kelo, wanted to challenge the 
development and the justification for it.  Under Connecticut law, however, property owners can 
challenge only the amount of compensation offered, not the right of the government to take their 
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property, which is why the case was brought under the Takings Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  In response to the initial challenge, the city, through the NLDC argued that the sale 
and subsequent development of the land would foster economic development and create a new 
tax base and, therefore, did not violate the Takings Clause.  Susette Kelo, on her own behalf and 
on behalf of and others who also had property taken by the city of New London sued the city in 
Connecticut state court. Susette Kelo argued, on behalf of all of the property owners, that their 
rights under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause were violated.  The Takings Clause provides 
“...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  (US Const., 
Amend. V.).  The Fifth Amendment did not create the national government's right to use eminent 
domain power or to allow others to use it.  All the Fifth Amendment did was to limit taking to 
“public use.”  In 1791, when the Fifth Amendment was added the battle over the ultimate 
definition of “public use” was yet to be waged.   
The battle was waged, largely, when Susette Kelo’s case was tried and, with 
regard to certain land owners the Superior Court’s Memorandum opinion indicated that the City 
had not demonstrated that the land would be used for public use.  The Memorandum opinion was 
appealed.  The opinion of the Supreme Court of Connecticut was entered on March 9, 2004.   A 
four-justice majority of the Court held that none of the challenged condemnations violated the 
United States or Connecticut Constitutions.  Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration was filed 
by Susette Kelo which was denied on April 20, 2004. Susette Kelo then appealed the case to the 
United States Supreme Court pursuant to the Supreme Court’s federal question jurisdiction.  28 
U.S.C. § 1257(a).   
The case was briefed and argued before the United States Supreme Court.  Justice John 
Paul Stevens delivered the majority opinion of the Court on Thursday, June 23, 2005, upholding 
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the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision 5-4.  Kelo v. City of New London.  The Court held 
that the city's taking of the private property of Kelo and others and the city’s subsequent sale of 
that property to private real estate developers did in fact qualify as a "public use" within the 
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Kelo 
v. City of New London.  The Court noted that the city did not take the land solely to benefit a 
certain group of private individuals.  Instead, the Court decided that the City was following a 
legitimate economic development plan it had created.  As a result, the United States Supreme 
Court, in its own state spatial practice, which had been rescaled from the Connecticut State 
Supreme Court, held that the taking at issue in Kelo qualified as "public use" even though the 
land was not going to be used by the public. The spatial practice was determinative of the issue 
of whether the Fifth Amendment required "literal" public use.  The majority of the Court held 
that broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose' was sufficient, and 
the application of the doctrine of eminent domain was altered.  Kelo v. City of New London. 
Simplified, the Taking Clause basically guarantees that government will not take 
private property for public use without just compensation.  Here the property owners argued 
taking private property and selling it to private real estate developers was not a public use.  The 
property owners argued that, unlike in blight cases, where arguably the public would benefit 
from condemnation, there is nothing in the act of condemning non-blighted properties that 
constitutes a public purpose.  The Connecticut State Supreme Court disagreed and ruled for the 
city of New London.  The United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld that ruling.  The 
rescaling of power necessary to defend the legitimizing of the state’s spatial practice is inherent, 
and the flexibility inherent in the system by which the rescaling occurred is well illustrated. 
While, jurisprudentially, it appears clear that the Fifth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution should limit how and when the government's eminent domain power can be 
exercised, when “public good” or “public benefit” is involved, the Fifth Amendment frequently 
is not interpreted by Courts to limit or preclude eminent domain invocation.  Phrases such as 
“blight remediation,” “economic development,” “renewal,” or “urban revitalization” have all 
been cast as "public use" or “public benefit” sufficient to allow the circumvention of what would 
appear to be clear Fifth Amendment dictates.  Moreover, what constitutes “just compensation” 
has also become a matter of legal debate as we see Harvey’s devaluation for accumulation at 
play as a means to reduce what “just compensation” would constitute in the face of claims of 
economic blight.  In the end, when and how eminent domain can be used and what constitutes 
“just compensation” are factors determined by the state through either the legislature or the 
courts, the decision as between them also being made as a part of the flexible rescaling theorized 
herein.   
  These political entities acting in the “public interest” or determining “public use” 
frequently act in the best interest of capital while declaring “public use.” When he contends that 
"the whole history of legal decisions which, in most bourgeois democracies, favor the rights of 
private property . . . over social justice," Harvey is somewhat short-sighted, failing to recognize 
that the tendency of the judiciary depends on whose private property rights are being eschewed.  
(Harvey, 2006, p. 51).  Elsewhere, his recognition that privatization entails not only private but 
class privileged domains arguably accounts for this shortcoming.  (Harvey, 2006, p. 45).  In the 
above described Kelo case the state flexibly rescales its judiciary power to provide capital the 
benefit of subsidized economic growth through sanctioned dispossession in favor of capital. 
The rationale of the Kelo case has been extended into Appalachia through the 
routing and approval of power transmission lines.  The federal government, in that instance, 
 
 73 
initially made a scalar decision, employing an active spatial power, that it would be unable to 
justify the need for power lines that would be built if privately owned land was dispossessed.  
Political power, as a result, was spatially devolved to the regional scale to make such a 
justification.  This devolution of power constitutes an active spatial practice of the state flexibly 
rescaled to the regional scale.  
At that regional scale, PJM entered the picture in Appalachia to sell theories of 
instability, national insecurity, and rolling blackouts to justify the building of the line altogether.  
Another rescaling can be seen where approval of the projects, siting of the lines, and permitting 
was devolved further by an active state spatial practice from the regional scale to the state scale 
to state Public Service Commissions or Public Utility Commissions.  Finally, construction of the 
lines would have to occur within the states.  State public service commissions got involved to 
approve the routes for the lines and to bolster and ratify PJM's claim of need for a line, but an 
obstacle arose at the local level.   
Strong local opposition to the building of the lines meant that states, either eager 
to or required to satisfy their constituents to maintain power, might not approve the routing of the 
lines or ratify the need for the lines.  Now, the approval processes, which included rerouting of 
some lines to quash opposition and build at least tacit consent, resides in the states.  But as a final 
state spatial practice, active flexible rescaling is employed from a system with inherent 
flexibility.   Additional flexibility within the state to rescale again exists in the system in the form 
of federal backstop authority at the federal scale.   
Section 368 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) directed the Federal 
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and the Interior to designate corridors 
for electricity transmission and distribution facilities on Federal lands in 11 contiguous Western 
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States (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming), to perform necessary environmental review, and to incorporate the 
designated corridors into relevant agency land use and resource management plans. The 
secretaries are to consider national need for additional infrastructure and to take actions (spatial 
practices) to “improve reliability, relieve congestion, and enhance the capability of the national 
grid to deliver energy.” EPAct also allowed the secretaries to identify corridors in the other 39 
states and allowed the secretary to engage in spatial practices which would “expedite processes” 
for energy projects in the corridors, thereby providing federal legislative authority for federal 
backstop powers in the event the devolution of power to the states for approval of the electrical 
transmission line projects was unsuccessful in allowing capital expansion and flexible rescaling 
was again required.  It should be noted that Section 368 of EPAact also instructs agencies to 
form corridors for oil, gas, and hydrogen pipelines.  
As a result, by passing the Energy Act of 2005 into law, the state, at the federal 
government scale, retained the right to declare national energy corridors if the states failed to 
approve the need for and routing of a high voltage transmission line like the one at issue with the 
TrAIL project.  Once declared, the state could flexibly rescale and the federal government could 
reassume power from the states to approve the process, ultimately flexibly rescaling to approve 
both the building and the routing of the lines if states would not.   
In this example, the power to take the land needed for the lines, the power to 
declare a need for the lines, and the power to control the routing of the lines can be seen 
manifesting itself to the benefit of capital at various scales at various times to ensure the building 
of the transmission lines in question.  The state’s active spatial practice of both changing the 
scale of power and of building into the system a flexible means by which the scale of power 
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could be changed if necessary amounts to flexible rescaling in action.   
In this example we see a flexibility created in the system to anticipate a potential 
need to rescale.  Whereas the judiciary and executive branches were created with flexibility 
inherent, the regulatory system on the executive side also possesses the ability, through 
employment of the legislative branch when laws are enacted or on its own through rule-making 
powers granted to the executive to create flexibility within the system in case power to regulate 
needs shifted.  When EPAct included federal backstop authority at the federal scale, and when 
PMJ was created at the regional scale, additional flexibility was built into the system by 
legislative action so that transfers of power are possible if necessary.  
Thereafter, where it is thought to be most efficient to act on a federal level 
unnoticed, then power is flexibly rescaled and devolved at that scale.  When it is thought to be 
most efficient to act on a regional level, then power is flexibly rescaled and devolved at that scale 
to built consent by creating a general need for the project.  And when it is thought to be most 
efficient to act on a state level, fracturing opposition and obtaining further consent, this time by 
force if necessary, then power is flexibly rescaled and devolved at that scale. Importantly, note 
that when the chosen scale reveals itself not to be the most efficient without opposition, then a 
flexibility inherent in the system is used to redistribute the power to sanction or approve the 
decision to another scale by state spatial practices that amount to flexibly rescaling. 
Capital has become so dependent on this flexible rescaling and on state support 
for capital accumulation and its corresponding uneven development, that capitalists assume their 
expansion requests will be fulfilled.  "Then we'll take it," she said, when one West Virginia 
landowner asked "what if we do not want to sell [our property to the power company]?"  
(Dominion Post, April 16, 2008).  This demonstrated dependence on flexible rescaling to get the 
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job done shows how flexible rescaling operates unseen to guarantee to capital the ability to 
transition seamlessly between forms of capital accumulation to create continuing uneven 
development. 
  The eminent domain practices attempted here, with high voltage power 
transmission lines, reflect Harvey's realization that "[a]ccumulation by dispossession entails a 
very different set of practices from accumulation through the expansion of wage labor in industry 
and agriculture."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 52).  Harvey notes that "dispossession ... is fragmented and 
particular-- a privatization here, an environmental degradation there, a financial crisis of 
indebtedness somewhere else."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 52).  The linear path of dispossessions in 
electrical transmission line disputes over miles, counties, and states fragments the possibility of 
effective resistance and diminishes the ability to coordinate resistance across regulated areas.  
This inability to mount effective resistance is characteristic of accumulation by dispossession as 
Harvey defined it.  Specifically, Harvey noted that accumulation by expanded reproduction 
"gave rise to an oppositional culture (such as that embedded in trade unions and working class 
political parties)."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 52).  Here, with fragmented dispossession, opposition 
organized around shared culture is diminished. Examining this process from the vantage point of 
the state, capital, and the landowners potentially impacted by the construction of the lines allows 
a clearer picture of when, how, and why power is shifted by the state. 
The shift in the definition of public use discussed in this example and the active 
state spatial practice of flexible rescaling that accompanied that shift with regard to power lines 
reflect the fact that "[c]apitalist activity is always grounded somewhere.  Diverse material 
processes (physical, ecological, as well as social) must be appropriated, used, bent and re-shaped 
to the purposes and paths of capital accumulation."  (Harvey, 2006, p. 78).  The United States 
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Supreme Court did just that with its Kelo decision and in the case of TrAIL and the power line 
battles that followed it. 
   7.2.2 Mountaintop Removal in Appalachia 
  If we examine a second resource dispossession within Appalachia, different 
aspects of flexible rescaling, as well as flexible rescaling in a different context—that of 
accumulation by dispossession to stave off a crisis, can be developed.   We can examine 
Harvey’s second kind of accumulation by dispossession—that employed to stave off crisis—as 
employing multi-scalar transitions that amount to flexible rescaling as an active spatial practice 
of the state when we examine mountaintop removal in Appalachia. In examining mountaintop 
removal we also can see, for the first time, lateral flexible rescaling, illustrating another aspect of 
the system’s inherent flexibility.  Unlike in the other examples where power is pushed up or 
down to benefit capital interests, here power is shifted laterally to benefit capital interests, as will 
be more fully explored below. 
  Mountaintop removal appeared as an industrial advance that rose from the 
continuing unevenness in coal that has marked Appalachian industrialization.  This unevenness 
set the stage for the emergence if this new state supported advance.  Here, the historical context 
of the development of the coal industry in Appalachia proves important. 
Despite dating Appalachian industrialization squarely between 1880 and 1930, 
Eller recognizes that as early as the 1790's small quantities of coal were mined in some areas of 
Appalachia.  (Eller, 1982, p. 4).  In fact, as early as the 1740's, rich coal and iron deposits were 
documented in the mountains. (Eller, 1982, p. 44).  After 1900, the practice of combining coal 
and timber interests in the land companies to fully exploit the available resources of the land, 
however, changed the character of the coal industry.  (Eller, 1982, p. 95). The timber industry 
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declined rapidly after its apex in 1909, (Eller, 1982, p. 109) and the coal industry rose to the 
industrial forefront.   
A major source of population increase between 1880 and 1930 was attributable to 
the coal boom. (Eller, 1982, p. 134).  The demand for coal increased steadily after 1900.  (Eller, 
1982).  In 1917, the Scotts Run coal field in northern West Virginia opened with an industrial 
fervor largely unmatched, sparking early coal primacy in the northern coal fields.  By 1932 the 
industry had virtually collapsed everywhere.  The five mile long hollow of Scotts Run was one 
of the most intensely developed coal districts in the United States. (Lewis, 2002).  As a result of 
such development, as discussed in the first example, many West Virginians left their agricultural 
living for coal mining.  At the same time, Appalachians outside West Virginia were not 
benefitting yet from coal's industrialization of the mountains.  It would take time for the coal 
industry to spread south with increased wartime demand. 
When post-war demand decreased, the labor-capital conflict intensified.  (Lee, 
1969).  This conflict, like the industry generally, also developed unevenly.  Worker cooperation 
through labor unions organized along the class divide was viewed as radical.  (Lewis, 2002).  
The state attempted to crush such cooperation, and it did so under the banner of Americanization. 
(Hennen, 1998).  But coal conflict intensified in southern West Virginia and Eastern Kentucky, 
and violence erupted in those areas.  (Lee, 1969; Corbin, 1981; and Hevener, 1978). 
Within the coal industry, a further economic sector division occurred.  Federal 
coal price legislation caused a shift in buying habits away from middle operators to the coal 
giants.  Those industrialized giants, however, did not absorb the unemployment that flowed from 
the abandonment of mines by the small and middle operators.  Following the closure of most 
smaller mines, a later price differentiation of ten cents per ton of coal was placed into the federal 
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regulations, but that price differential was applied too late to respond to the outflow of business 
from small and middle operators to larger enterprises when those smaller operators could not 
compete with lesser grade coal at one fixed, higher price, and big capital backed by the state 
prevailed.   
Federal Regulations governing the processing and sale of coal had mandated that 
all coal be sold at the same price, meaning that there was no demand for coal of lower quality 
when consumers, whether individual or industrial, would have to pay the same price regardless.  
Here we see scaled state actions impacting capital long before the advent of mountaintop 
removal.  Middle operators were put out of business by the state's economic regulation of the 
industry to the benefit of capital.  Capital accumulation in the hands of big capital resulted as the 
larger operators absorbed the benefits and profit of smaller operators and experienced a much 
needed capital expansion in that regard.  
Greater industrialization of the coal industry also led to a dramatic reduction in 
costs of production for the largest producers and the concomitant elimination of thousands of 
mining jobs.  Practices which sacrificed the environment and the livelihoods of Appalachians, 
sanctioned by the state, as well practices which sacrificed their land, also sanctioned by the state, 
abounded, and the mining industry in Appalachia flourished. Coal production would remain 
isolated in the central Appalachian states because of resource unavailability or, at the least, 
limitation in other areas.  As a result, while the West Virginia coal fields were experiencing their 
height, southern Appalachia had not yet been economically impacted to the same degree by 
industrial change.  Throughout the process stark economic, political, environmental, legal, and 
social developments, all occurring during this period, acted as the shifting foundation for 
completion of capitalist change.  (Erikson, 1976).   
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Coal increased the pace of economic development, aided by federal scale 
interventions that benefitted capital.  Coal development on Scotts Run flourished rapidly starting 
with the mining of the first ton of coal there.  By 1917, the price of coal had stabilized when the 
Federal Fuel Administration set the price for soft coal at $2.58 per ton.  (Eller, 1982).  This 
influence by the state on the market, referenced above, marks the first state intervention into the 
capitalist process noted here.  If we are to adopt Smith's traditional state scaling, this intervention 
took place at the national scale.   
Like the remainder of West Virginia, when coal development on Scotts Run saw 
its greatest growth it was fueled by demand resulting from World War I.  The industry also 
expanded so rapidly because of incentives to take coal to market at low rates offered by the 
railroads to encourage an increase in coal traffic on the rails.  (Thomas, 1998).  Any operator 
who could get coal cars could sell his coal.  (Eller, 1982, p. 155).  By 1920, the wartime Federal 
Fuel Administration released price controls, and at times coal sold at or near fourteen dollars per 
ton, a comparatively very high price which marked the second intervention at this same federal 
scale.  Later the federal government again would institute a third intervention in the form of price 
controls, and the price of coal again would plummet.  (Eller, 1982, p. 156). Smaller mines often 
operated at peak production during times of high demand, but when the price of coal decreased 
they often closed down, and economic growth correspondingly slowed.  (Eller, 1982, p. 153).  
After 1927 prices would fall, not because of regulation, but with demand, and the period of more 
rapid industrialization would end in favor of a return to slower advances.  (Eller, 1982, p. 157). 
Wages also impacted economic conditions over time, again aided by federal 
interventions.  Non-union competition made operation of union mines difficult, labor relations 
were strained, and violence erupted in the West Virginia coal fields.  (Lee, 1969).  Demand for 
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coal decreased during the 1920's; production and wages decreased with it.  The miners suffered.  
By 1927, miners were making less than their 1917 wages.  Between 1923 and 1927 over 200,000 
miners left the coal fields.  (Eller, 1982).  Per capita wages of miners dropped from $851 in 1923 
to $235 by 1933.  These changes compounded already poor economic and social conditions.  
Likewise, mechanization of the coal industry resulted in the even more lost jobs and the 
attendant temporal decline of industrialization.  Industries such as textiles and timber would 
experience similar uneven progressions (Lewis, 1998, and Williams, 2001). 
Regardless, coal continue to be king in Appalachia as the deep mining and surface 
mining of the state continued, largely in the hands of large operators, through the turn of the 
millennium.  But a new development in coal was just around the corner.  The time had arrived 
for the introduction of mountaintop removal. With the introduction of mountaintop removal we 
see the introduction of state spatial practices at scales other than the federal regulatory scale, 
illustrating flexible rescaling at work in Appalachia again for another land acquisition.  
  If we return to Lewis's theory that Appalachian industrialization is an ongoing 
process, we can continue to examine that industrialization as it reached a point of crisis when 
traditional mining in West Virginia declined and when operators began to fear the exhaustion of 
resources attainable by deep mining.  We then see the emergence, through state spatial practices 
that amount to heavy facilitation by the state, of another dispossession of land in the form of the 
relatively new practice of mountaintop removal.  This dispossession is an example of the 
accumulation by dispossession that Harvey noted as distinguishable from original or primitive 
accumulation by its role in ongoing dispossession meant to avert capitalist crisis. 
In its simplest explanation, mountaintop removal is a form of surface mining.  
The surface of a mountaintop is “removed” to allow for the extraction of a coal seam at the 
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surface.  The land above the coal seam is moved to an adjacent valley, and the valley is filled in 
with the land removed from the top of the seam.  The process usually occurs through high impact 
blasting.  Often more than 100 meters of dirt and rock are removed from the top of the mountain 
with explosives to allow the exposure and extraction of the coal seam. (Burns, 2007). 
Mountaintop removal has been the subject of significant public and legal 
opposition. (House and Howard, 2009).  State spatial practices at the federal level that changed 
existing federal legislation allowed the process in the first instance, so like traditional mining, 
initial state involvement begins at the federal scale.  In 1977, the enactment of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act, amounted to a spatial practice 
by Congress at the federal scale.  The stated purpose of the action was to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. (Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 1977).  The Clean Water Act allows the obtaining of a permit to place “fill 
material” into waters of the United States, provided that the primary purpose of the “filling” was 
not for waste disposal. (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 1977).  As written, therefore, the 
Clean Water Act prohibited Mountaintop removal, because no valley fills were allowed for 
disposal of Mountaintop removal “waste.”  However, in 2002, the Army Corps of Engineers 
which issues the permits for the dumping of “fill material” into American waterways, at the 
behest of the Bush administration, absent congressional approval, which was not required for 
such amendment, changed the longstanding definition of “fill material,” and included or 
redesignated mining residues as a defined “fill material” rather than waste, officially sanctioning 
mountaintop removal and flexibly rescaling to take the power away from the Clean Water Act 
and laterally shifting power, bringing its control under the umbrella of the Army Corps of 
Engineers. 
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When the Army Corps of Engineers changed the definition of “fill material” we 
see an example, for the first time of lateral flexible rescaling.  The Corp operates, as does 
Congress, at the federal scale, but the actions of Congress would have disallowed mountaintop 
removal mining.  Capital needed mountaintop removal mining to spur the coal industry, and help 
for capital came not from a scalar shift up or down, but from a flexible lateral rescaling.  Power 
remained at the federal scale but moved from the legislative to the executive branch. 
Since that time, the Appalachia Restoration Act has been introduced in the Senate 
in an attempt to restore the original meaning of fill material in the Clean Water Act and to return 
mining debris to the category of waste, as well as to shift power back laterally from the executive 
to the legislative branch. (Appalachian Restoration Act).  The Appalachian Restoration Act 
suggests a definition of fill material be added to the Clean Water Act, which would include an 
exclusion from fill material of “the disposal of excess spoil material (as described in Section 
515(b)(22) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act….”  (Appalachian Restoration 
Act). 
The state is spatially active in other areas on mountaintop removal than just 
permitting.  After active mining has been completed federal law requires that the disturbed areas 
of the mining operation by “reclaimed.”  This requirement originates out of the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977(SMCRA), referenced above. (Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act, 1977).  The Act was enacted at a time when mountaintop removal was not yet 
in practice.  Ultimately the Act allowed for two dispossessions of land: the dispossession of 
actual land which is mined as well as the dispossession of attendant resources through adjacent 
valley fills and through use or consumption or destruction of public water resources.  There is 
one federal scale state spatial practice at work that results in two spatial impacts that benefit 
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capital.   
The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that by 2012, two decades of 
mountaintop removal will have destroyed or degraded 11.5 percent of the forests in West 
Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, and Tennessee, an area larger than Delaware, and that mountaintop 
removal waste will have buried more than 1,000 miles of streams. (Mountaintop Mining 
Programmatic EIS, 2005). Smithsonian author John McQuaid observed “I've reported on 
devastation around the world—from natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, to wars in 
Central America and the Middle East, to coastlines in Asia degraded by fish farming. But in the 
sheer audacity of its destruction, mountaintop coal removal is the most shocking thing I've ever 
seen. Entering a mountaintop site is like crossing into a war zone.” (McQuaid, 2009). Facts like 
these and the opponents they create caused the shift away from lateral rescaling that becomes 
evident when we examine challenges to mountaintop removal.   
Political and legal opposition to the new method of mining developed, but the 
state continued to flexibly rescale as necessary.  McQuaid notes the state level support for capital 
that would underlie challenges as that scale, stating that “West Virginia's political establishment 
has been unwavering in its support for the coal industry.”  (McQuaid, 2009).  West Virginia 
Governor Joe Manchin also spoke on the state scale support of the industry stating at a Coal 
Association meeting "Government should be your ally, not your adversary," illustrating flexible 
rescaling at work to rescale to the state scale from the federal scale with permitting control then 
in the hands of the Army Corps of Engineers to allow such dispossessions.  (McQuaid, 2009). 
In 1990, at the federal level, amendments to the Clean Water Act established a 
requirement that there be "no net loss of wetlands." (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 1990).  
In conjunction with mountaintop removal, to valley fill, a coal company must obtain a permit 
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from the United States Army Corps of Engineers.  The Corps is charged with evaluating the 
environmental impact as well as any required remedial action as a result thereof before issuing 
such a permit.  The corresponding National Environmental Policy Act can also require a detailed 
environmental impact statement to be completed before a permit is issued.  (National 
Environmental Policy Act, 1969).  But coal companies have obtained the required permits 
without the Corp actually evaluating possible environmental impacts.  These instances have been 
challenged in West Virginia in front of Judge Chambers of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of West Virginia. Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, et al. v. U.S. Army 
Corps. of Engineers, et al. 
In that matter Plaintiffs, the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, requested that 
the Federal District Court find that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers violated the Clean Water 
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act by issuing four permits to fill headwater streams 
in conjunction with mountaintop removal coal mining. Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, et 
al. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, et al.  In a 2007, decision in that case, Judge Chambers’ 
opinion amounted to a state spatial practice at the state scale.  The opinion stated that "the Corps 
has failed to take a hard look at the destruction of headwater streams and failed to evaluate their 
destruction as an adverse impact on aquatic resources in conformity with its own regulations and 
policies," but the opinion allowed ongoing mountaintop removal projects to proceed. Ohio 
Valley Environmental Coalition, et al. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, et al.  The case was 
appealed the case to the historically conservative Virginia-based United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, at yet another scale—the regional scale- which had already acted to allow 
mountaintop removal mining in other instances.  
Another Southern District Judge, The Honorable Charles H. Haden II, after 
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visiting a mountaintop removal mining site in southern West Virginia, noted: 
[M]ined sites were visible from miles away. The sites stood out 
among the natural wooded ridges as huge white plateaus, and the 
valley fills appeared as massive, artificially landscaped stair steps. 
Compared to the thick hardwoods of surrounding undisturbed hills, 
the mine sites appeared stark and barren and enormously different 
from the original topography. 
 
Bragg v. Robertson.  Nonetheless, mountaintop removal mining continues, aided by the 
continual shifts in power up and down between the federal, regional, and state scales and 
laterally within scales that remain a part of the state’s active spatial practice of flexible rescaling 
capable of advancing the interests of capital.  
"Industrialization has integrated the mountains into the dominant economy of the 
country as a whole, and it has rendered the region increasingly subject to the fluctuations of the 
national market system."  (Eller, 1982, p. 227).  As a result, what started as a local industry has 
fallen under national control as flexible scaling revealed itself within the mining industry.  
Despite withdrawal of consent and state support during the union battles of the early twentieth 
century, the state has now reappeared as capital’s ally as flexible rescaling shifts power again.     
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has developed the new concept of flexible rescaling as a means 
of attempting to fill the prior gap in the literature left by the under-theorized role of the state in 
uneven development.  As a researcher I admittedly have been influenced by my own liberal 
social tendencies, but what has emerged: evidence of and conceptualization and theoretical 
development of the active and deliberate state spatial practice of flexible rescaling that is 
employed by the state to impact uneven development to the benefit of capital absent a need for a 
formal restructuring of power or of the state which might result in resistance if not crisis, 
advances the theory of the state’s role in uneven development. 
I chose the examples that illustrate the theory, because I thought they would 
provide a cohesiveness.  This cohesiveness is achieved, because the examples are all from within 
Appalachia and the examples are all based in land practices.  Returning to dialectics, these are 
the two most important identities of the examples which ultimately allow their differences to be 
better understood. 
In choosing the examples to illustrate the theory it was also important to me to 
choose examples that impacted both accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by 
expanded reproduction.  The eminent domain examples here meet that requirement.  The 
example of high voltage power transmission lines and the attendant dispossessions demonstrates 
more traditional accumulation by dispossession, and the example of mountaintop removal, while 
still illustrative of accumulation by dispossession of the commons, is more demonstrative of a 
state spatial practice that allows accumulation by expanded reproduction, in that case mining.   
Finally, in choosing examples it was important to me to choose examples that 
would illustrate conventional expansion for expansion’s sake, illustrated by the transfer of land 
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to capital for power line construction, and that would illustrate expansion as a means to avert a 
capital crisis, illustrated by mountaintop removal. 
Recent events have made me consider research regarding the flexible rescaling 
brought about by the 2010 BP gulf oil spill where, to me, flexible rescaling can already be seen.  
Federal government allocation of funds to assist victims of the spill in lieu of that aid coming 
from BP amounts to a spatial practice that results in a redistribution of resources that benefits 
capital.  Even if some individuals or entities receive relief from any state fund that is created, if 
they eventually become stakeholders in an action against BP, then BP will legally be entitled to a 
credit set-off for any monies paid to the victims to make them whole.  The law acts to prevent a 
windfall, and, in doing so, it flexibly rescales power to benefit capital. 
In examining what this dissertation is and is not, I return to my acknowledgment 
that the dissertation was never meant to be a new comprehensive theory of the state or of uneven 
development.  After using the theorizations to date, I am not convinced a completely new and 
comprehensive theory of either is needed, but, to be sure, such a theorization is a life’s work, not 
a dissertation. 
During my research I discovered that a transfer of power by the state in order to 
flexibly rescale can be accomplished not only by movement of power up and down through the 
system, but also through lateral rescaling- a type of flexible rescaling I had not considered when 
I set out to develop this theory and which was not included in my proposal.  As I postulated 
before writing the dissertation, the ability inherent within the state to flexibly rescale results in a 
system where the state can employ the active spatial practice of rescaling to control uneven 
development to the benefit of capital. What I did not expect was for power to travel laterally with 
similar result, a discovery that I think advances the theory and proves its applicability and utility 
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even more than I anticipated. 
As a result, it is apparent that flexible rescaling occurs between and within scales.  
Within scales flexible rescaling occurs laterally, as was demonstrated with the case of 
mountaintop removal mining where changes between the legislative and executive policy at the 
federal level occurred.  Between scales flexible rescaling occurs as anticipated, when power 
moves up and down between scales, best illustrated with examples that show appeals within the 
inherently stratified legal system at work to change policy to benefit capital.   
Regardless of whether flexible rescaling is lateral or stratified, the active spatial 
practices of the state, through both action and decided inaction, amount to shifts in power that 
benefit capital and illustrate and develop the active spatial role of the state in impacting uneven 
development.  The inherent flexibility within the system does not require a formal restructuring 
for either lateral or stratified shifts in power.  As a result, flexible rescaling is a powerful tool by 
which the state actively engages in spatial practices that benefit capital and impact uneven 
development as a result. 
During the research proposal I identified several questions which, looking back on 
my research to date, remain unanswered or lack full development.  Some are explicitly noted 
within the dissertation, such as the benefit of additional research into ruling class control of the 
media and propaganda and what role that control plays in securing legitimation and/or consent, 
as well as how that control itself is fostered by the state as a secondary aspect of flexible 
rescaling.   
Other questions emerged when examining the conceptual development.  During 
the actual research it became apparent to me that more in depth case studies might allow the 
dialectical method to reveal itself better and might allow for a better understanding of the 
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interconnections between the state’s actions and capital.  More in depth case studies might also 
allow time to address some of the issues identified previously in my research proposal which 
were not answered or parsed out to my satisfaction in this dissertation.  For example, while my 
proposal postulated that Harvey’s theory of imperialist practices could be expanded from his 
chosen international scale to the intranational scale, ultimately this dissertation spent more time 
developing the new concept of flexible rescaling than it did attempting to alter the scale of 
Harvey’s theory and testing whether such alternation survives theoretically.  While the 
dissertation conducts examination on an intranational scale and recognizes that the engines that 
drive power processes on that intranational scale are money, productive capacity, and regulatory 
power, only regulatory power is examined at any length herein.   
The time required over the past six years to read, research, and, most importantly, 
synthesize a new conceptual development like flexible rescaling prevented the type of in depth 
case study that might later reveal more about the theory.  Theoretical development was also 
necessary before such a detailed case study could be undertaken.  The process of developing the 
theory and exemplifying it further refined the theory making it more appropriate for 
consideration as part of an in depth case study going forward than it might have been for this 
dissertation. 
Additionally, the theory developed explains how the state shifts power to benefit 
capital, but there is a Marxist analysis waiting in the wings as to why the state shifts power to 
benefit capital; the inclusion of Massey’s work and Howitt’s work on connections and relations 
was used and useful in the process of the theoretical development but could be revisited as the 
theory is tested and developed further; and the role of consent as well as identity formation could 
be further developed by examining the impact of consent, or lack thereof, on additional spatial 
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practices and the impact of flexible rescaling on level and nature of consent. 
The use of dialectics in the dissertation proved to be a good choice, but I struggled 
with how explicit to make the appearance and use of its abstractions so as to not become too 
positivist in my analysis.  While dialectics can itself appear formulaic and over-structured with 
its lists of relations, modes of abstraction, levels of generality, and laws of the dialectic, at the 
same time- to me- it seems almost too flexible and hard to pin down precisely, because it is 
designed to reflect the changing nature of things and the ever-shifting relationships between 
them.  Move your focus ever so slightly and your whole analysis can change.  Keep your focus 
steadfast and risk defeating the point of a relational analysis.  Deciding that Ollman himself did 
not make explicit reference to the methodology of dialectics with frequency in his examples, I 
decided to allow the abstractions to reveal themselves except where I could not resist including a 
strong example of dialectics at work or except where I felt the need to be explicit in order to 
justify the use of dialectics or to illustrate the benefit of the use of dialectics.     
Hopefully the development of the new theory of flexible rescaling adds 
significantly to the geographic literature to date on the state’s spatial role in uneven development 
and to the theory of uneven development generally. Hopefully additional research will reveal 
even more about the role the state plays and why. 
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